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THE BRITISH SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE IN 1740

CASTILLO DE SAN MARCOS



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The British Siege of St. Augustine in 1740

CASTILLO DE SAN MARCOS NATIONAL MONUMENT / FLA.

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HISTORIC PRESERVATION TEAM
DENVER SERVICE CENTER
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Abstract

After several years of animosity between the neighboring colonies of Georgia and Florida, General James Oglethorpe, governor of Georgia, invaded Spanish Florida early in 1740. His objective was the capture and destruction of St. Augustine by a combined land and sea attack. As a result of preliminary inroads into Florida territory the forts of Picolata, Pupo, and San Diego fell into British hands.

On June 13 the forces of Georgia and South Carolina under Oglethorpe, and a naval force under Commodore Vincent Pearse, laid a formal siege to the town. Two English siege batteries were established at Anastasia and one at Point Quartell (Vilano Beach). Castillo de San Marcos and six galliots defended the harbor and the town. After an unsuccessful siege of 38 days and a bombardment of 27 days, the troops were forced to abandon the enterprise.

Preface

This report fulfills the requirements of Resource Study Proposal H-14 for Castillo de San Marcos National Monument. As requested, the study traces the origin of the British attack on St. Augustine in 1740 and ascertains its objective, the strength of the combatants, existing defenses of the besieged town, routes and plans of the besiegers, tactical dispositions and maneuvering, outcome of the siege and blockade, and reasons for the English failure to conquer Spanish Florida.

As far as operations are concerned, we have followed the day-to-day English accounts of this event. These accounts are in the form of numerous letters by British officers, abstracts from journals, and depositions of several key participants, most of them found in the Report of the South Carolina Assembly (1742). There is no complete day-to-day account of Spanish operations because, as they were the besieged, they naturally pursued a passive resistance and just waited for events to happen on the British camps in order to act accordingly. While the British sources are enriched with the different and often conflicting opinions of many land and naval officers, what is known about the Spaniards during the siege comes from the pen of the Spanish governor. Although he wrote numerous letters to the governor of Cuba, on whom he depended for aid, practically nothing is said in them about the drama that took place inside the walls of the besieged Castillo. This kind of human interest information is undoubtedly found in the voluminous papers dealing with the residencia (administrative review) of the Spanish governor, not available for this report. Outside of the above limitation of sources, the study that follows covers the subject of the siege as exhaustively as was possible.

In the completion of this report, a special thank you goes to Historian Luis R. Arana of the Castillo staff. His transcription of the Montiano letters from the East Florida Papers of the Library of Congress and many documents from the Stetson Collection, University of Gainesville, was an invaluable aid and a time-saving short cut.

In all Spanish and English sources there are discrepancies in connection with the use of dates. This is due to the fact that the English in 1740 still remained on the Julian calendar, while the Spaniards used the modern Gregorian calendar which at that time was 11 days ahead of the old system. In this report, all dates from English primary sources have been modernized by the addition of 11 days. That is, May 10 in the Julian calendar becomes May 21 in the Gregorian. With practically no exception, secondary sources make

no distinction between the two calendars, and consequently their chronology of events is a confusing maze. Some dates from secondary sources had to be changed also, but only when there was certainty that the dates followed the Julian calendar.

Bones of Contention

1. Clashing Frontier

Spain's claim to the South Atlantic coast was based on right of discovery, exploration, and occupation. Between 1566 and 1670 she maintained actual settlements all the way up the Florida--Georgia--South Carolina coast. These settlements were kept in existence through the aid of missionaries and soldiers, with the Presidio of St. Augustine--the capital of the province of Florida--the supporting base. From the Atlantic coast a line of missions extended to the west along the southern border all the way from Cumberland Island to the lower reaches of Apalachicola and thence onward to Pensacola.

After the founding of Charleston in 1670 the English colonists steadily encroached on the Spanish coastal settlements and challenged Spain's hold in the back country. By the treaty of 1670 the boundary was set at latitude 32° 30' or a line cutting off Bay Point, the southmost tip of Eclisto Island. But step by step the Spanish frontier receded from Santa Elena, Santa Catalina, Zapala, Altamaha, and St. Marys. During Queen Anne's War (1702-13) the frontier fell back to the St. Johns River.

In 1702, as an event of the war, Governor James Moore of Carolina, with a force of several hundred men and a like number of Creek Indian allies, besieged St. Augustine. This group converged on the town by land and sea, forcing its inhabitants to flee to the Castillo of San Marcos for shelter. For seven weeks the British laid siege to the fortress, but unable to breach the defenses finally withdrew, burning the city as they left. One year later Moore returned and stormed the Apalache and Timucua mission villages. Thereafter missionary activities were generally discontinued in Florida, despite later attempts to revive the religious complex.¹

During the years that followed Moore's attack, the English colonists continued their southern advance into Florida. By 1721 Great

1. Herbert E. Bolton (editor), Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia . . . (Berkeley, California, 1925), pp. 1-68; Charles W. Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702 (University of Florida Press, 1959); Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida (Washington, 1941), p. 65.

Britain had established a fort as far south as the Altamaha River.² Seven years later, John Palmer of Carolina, like Moore, knocked at the door of St. Augustine. He penetrated the Spanish area just north of the Castillo where he was stopped, but not until he had burned several Indian villages in the immediate vicinity of the town.³

When General James Oglethorpe **received** the Georgia grant in 1732-33, he improved his military position by fortifying Frederica (on Saint Simons Island) in 1736, followed by Jekyl (Gualquini), Cumberland (San Pedro), and Amelia Islands, and not long afterwards, San Juan Island at the mouth of the St. Johns. Fort St. Andrews was located on Cumberland Island, as was Fort William; and Fort St. George upon San Juan Island. Every one of these islands had previously been the site of Franciscan missions. Except for St. Simons, all these fortified islands were located beyond the southern boundary claimed by Oglethorpe.⁴

Oglethorpe's favorite project was to restrain the Spaniards to the south of the St. Johns.⁵ He wisely gauged his plans on the imperial scale, since the conquest of St. Augustine had been deemed a necessity by the Board of Trade as early as 1720, and later by the governor of Massachusetts.⁶

By 1739 the controversy with the settlement of Georgia was fast ripening into open hostilities. To the boundary problem was added

2. Robert L. Gold, Borderland Empires in Transition (Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), p. 10.

3. Chatelain, op. cit., p. 88.

4. Charles C. Jones, The History of Georgia (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1883), I, pp. 226-41; Chatelain, op. cit., pp. 88-89. St. Simons was not undisputed by the Spaniards. The Southern boundary of the Georgia grant was the Altamaha River, flowing into the ocean north of St. Simons. Only by claiming that some of the Altamaha's water flowed south between St. Simons and the mainland and out to sea through Jekyll Sound did Oglethorpe justify the inclusion of St. Simons in Georgia (Observation made by Historian Barry MacKintosh of the Branch of Park History).

5. Capt. Hugh M'Call, The History of Georgia . . . (Savannah, 1811), p. 119.

6. Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier 1670-1732 (The University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 226-27; "The Belcher Papers," Collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society, II, pp. 244-45, 390-91.

the question of slavery. At this time South Carolina had 40,000 slaves while the white population did not exceed 5,000. In January the governor of Florida, Manuel de Montiano, issued a royal proclamation whereby all runaway slaves from the British colonies would be protected, receive asylum in the town, and be set free if they became catholics.⁷

The Spaniards sent secret emisaries among the South Carolina slaves to convince them to flee and take refuge in St. Augustine and finally caused an insurrection.⁸

More important than the frontier problems of Georgia and Florida was the protracted quarrel between Spain and England over a matter of trade and sea power. Since the time of Hawkins and Drake Englishmen had been openly active as smugglers in Spanish American waters. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the South Sea Company was granted the legal right (asiento) to a limited amount of trade, and especially of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies. This right was abused by the Company. Spain complained of English contraband trade in the West Indies and of illegal logwood-cutting on the Honduras coast. Weary of protest, Spain established a rigorous system of guarda-costas to prevent smuggling, exercised the right of search and captured many British vessels. In some instances the Spanish sea captains committed acts of physical violence against English seamen.

Spain almost started a war in 1738. The Spanish governor of Cuba outfitted an expedition to invade the colony of Georgia, but it was stopped when word arrived from King Philip V that further negotiations were under way with England. St. Augustine's governor, however, was instructed to guard against any sudden attack and to take measures to put the castle and the fort of Apalache (near modern Tallahassee) in good defense posture.⁹

While negotiations were going on, the southern frontier grew restive. Spurred by Oglethorpe, bands of Lower Creek Indians began making raids on settlements in Florida and harassing Spanish soldiers and Indians west of St. Augustine. Encouraged by promises of rich

7. Robert Wright, A Memoir of James Oglethorpe (London, 1867), pp. 221; The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740. A Report of the South Carolina General Assembly [1742], reprinted with an introduction by John Tate Lanning, Columbia, 1954, p. 8 (hereafter SCR).

8. Rev. William Stevens, A History of Georgia . . . (Savannah, 1847), I, pp. 155-57.

9. Bolton, op. cit., pp. 75-78; East Florida Papers, Bundle 37, Library of Congress, Docs. 18, 38, 41, 43 (hereafter EFP).

rewards for Spanish scalps, the Creeks attacked Fort Pupo on the St. Johns in the summer of 1738, damaging the fort stockade and killing two Spanish soldiers. At the same time Oglethorpe began building up a force of militiamen and Indians at Frederica.¹⁰

Border raids continued through 1738 and 1739, spreading terror among the settlers. Negotiations continued also for another year, but by the summer of 1739 it was evident that a negotiated settlement would not be reached. By this time English public opinion had become so bitter against Spain's reprisals on the high seas that war was in the offing. Newcastle, the British Secretary of State, authorized Oglethorpe, as military commander of South Carolina and Georgia, to begin preparations for the coming conflict. One of his first steps was to visit the Creek Indians of Georgia at Corveta in the summer and keep them in line to hold the west.¹¹

As a principle of policy, British ships on the American station were allocated to protect a particular locality, but in the event any colony was threatened, they were to act together for its defense. As early as June 11, 1739, the British Admiralty issued orders to the commanders of the Phoenix (S.C.), the Hector (Va.), the Flamborough (N.Y.), the Squirrel (New England), the Tartar and the sloop Spence (Bahamas) that, in the event of an attack on Georgia, they were to endeavor to protect "the said settlements from any attempts that may be made on them, either by taking, sinking, burning or otherwise destroying the ships, vessels or boats which the Spaniards may employ thereon."¹² These orders were confirmed and emphasized in July, when the commanders of the British ships stationed in American waters were directed to go to the assistance of South Carolina and Georgia "upon the least suspicion" of a Spanish attack. When Vice-Admiral Edward Vernon was despatched to the West Indies to destroy Spanish settlements and distress their shipping, his instructions included the shielding of the southern provinces should an attack be expected and the sending of "such ships as you shall think proper for the defense of those our possessions, and for taking and intercepting the Spanish ships, sloops or boats that may be sent from the Havanna for that purpose."¹³

10. Archivo General de Indias, Santo Domingo, Legajo 2541, gobernador Montiano to the king, August 31, 1738; "Testimonio sobre haber arribado a este presidio tres ingleses de las colonias . . .," August 23, 1738; Legajo 2530, Consulta del Consejo de Indias, February 14, 1739 (hereafter AGI-SD).

11. Bolton, op. cit., pp. 79-85; Jones, op. cit., pp. 315-19.

12. Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office Papers (CO), Admiralty 2/55, p. 445.

13. Add. MSS 32692, Newcastle Papers (British Museum), ff. 128-32, Instructions to Vernon, July 16, 1739.

Late in September Oglethorpe received orders from the British crown, dated June 26, to annoy the Spaniards in the best manner he was able. He sent an officer into the Cherokee Nation to raise as many as 1,000 Indians to march down into the Spanish territory; he also sent commissioners into the Creek Nation and an express to attack the Spaniards, hoping they would strike the first blow. Oglethorpe hoped to receive from Carolina the necessary assistance to begin the siege of St. Augustine before more troops arrived from Habana or Spain.¹⁴

Oglethorpe's instructions to attack St. Augustine were dated October 9, 1739. He was to attack the town if he thought it practicable and raise troops, including Indians, in Georgia and South Carolina. He was to undertake the attack

without loss of time; and, if it shall please God to give you success, you are either to demolish the said town and fortress, or put a garrison in it, in case you shall have men enough for that purpose; which last, it is thought, will be the best way to prevent the Spaniards from endeavouring to retake and settle the said place again, at any time hereafter.

Naval commanders of the American station were directed to assist him in the enterprise and prevent the entrance of supplies from Habana.¹⁵

At noon on Wednesday, October 14, 1739, the magistrates and militia of Georgia repaired to the courthouse to hear Oglethorpe announce the hostilities between England and Spain. Three years of negotiations in London and Madrid had failed to resolve the differences between the two countries. These differences led to the opening of the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1742), a war that was to be waged on both sides of the Atlantic, in the West Indies and the Americas as well as in Europe. England officially declared war on October 23, and Spain on November 28.¹⁶ The war was directed

14. SCR, Doc. 1, 2, 3.

15. The Colonial Records of Georgia (Atlanta, 1904-1916), Vol. XXXV, p. 112 (hereafter CRG).

16. Jones, op. cit., p. 320; Herbert E. Bolton, The Colonization of North America 1492-1783 (New York, the Macmillian Company, 1935), p. 361.

almost exclusively at Spain's commerce and her colonies, with the Caribbean area as the main target. Lucrative prizes were Cuba, Puerto Bello, or Cartagena, the destruction of which would deal a crippling blow to Spain's position in the New World. With Vice-Admiral Vernon at the center of the naval stage in the Caribbean, the St. Augustine campaign was relegated to a sideshow on land in which Oglethorpe played the chief role.¹⁷

2. Spanish Resources

St. Augustine, the object of Oglethorpe's plans, had been a Spanish presidio, or fortified town, since 1565. Its primary purpose was to aid in the protection of Spanish colonies farther to the south, shield the shipping lanes, and serve as a base for missionary activities among the local Indian tribes.

By the time the war broke out, the Spanish fighting force, including the reinforcements received from Cuba in 1738, numbered about 600 men stationed in St. Augustine and scattered along the northern portion of the colony. Since 1738 the Castillo and other fortifications had been in the process of improvement and strengthening.¹⁸

Castillo de San Marcos was the principal fortification, a massive, well-built structure located just northeast of the town to protect the place from land and sea attacks. The castle was not too large, but a covered way on the landward side provided shelter for those who could not be accommodated in the fortress in case of a long siege. There was also an earthen line of intrenchment (Cubo Line) extending from the castle to San Sebastian River on the west, thus further protecting the northern part of the town. This line had three redoubts and a moat in front, with yucca planted along the scarp; but its parapet was too thin, the moat shallow and narrow, and the redoubts too small. Another line (Rosario Line) girded the west and south of St. Augustine, most of it a yucca-line earthwork strengthened by five redoubts.

17. For the Caribbean campaign see Sir William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy . . . 7 vols., (Boston, 1897-1903), III, pp. 51-52, 58, 67, 265-67; Francis Russell Hart, Admirals of the Caribbean (Boston, 1922), 139-40; Worthington Chauncey Ford, The Vernon-Wager Manuscripts in the Library of Congress (Washington, D. C., 1904), pp. 60-99 passim.

18. EFP, Docs. 41, 57, 63, 74, 113.

Two miles north of the town was Fort Mose. Built to protect a village of runaway Carolina Negro slaves. Although a small, seemingly unimportant little structure, this fort was to play a major role in the forthcoming conflict. About 18 to 20 miles north of St. Augustine was Fort San Diego, sitting amid cattle country called the Diego Plains. About 18 miles to the west of town, on the east side of the St. John's, was Picolata Fort. Together with Fort San Francisco de Pupo on the opposite side of the river, Picolata guarded the important road path to the fort of Apalache in Western Florida, where the Spaniards had a garrison; the two forts also blocked possible enemy movements by water up the St. Johns. There were also a number of small posts along the seacoast --like Anastasia and Matanzas lookouts--and the St. Johns River. Matanzas lookout was on an inlet that provided access to the town from the south.¹⁹

St. Augustine was situated on the mainland, to the west of the north end of Anastasia, a very narrow island but of considerable length. Between the island and the mainland was Matanzas River--about four or five hundred yards wide in most places--at the north end of which was the harbor of St. Augustine. As to the harbor, its main entrance was very difficult due to the sand banks which formed two channels for any sort of ships getting inside. One of these was called the North Channel, which was the deepest, and faced almost directly the north end of Anastasia. Consequently, a ship entering by this channel was exposed, during the whole course to the guns of the castle which it must pass to get at the key, or any part of the town. The other was the South Channel which pointed in upon the east side of the island. Near the northeast corner, and directly fronting this channel, the Spaniards had a sand battery to which a ship entering by this channel was exposed until it had turned the northeast corner of the island; by the time the ship approached the northwest corner, it began to be exposed to the cannon of the castle. Both channels were shallow and no ship of great burden could get into the harbor, or come near the town or castle of San Marcos.²⁰

In conclusion, the above were the defenses of St. Augustine at the time of the invasion of Florida. They were not formidable, but by nature were strong.

When the war was declared the military force of Georgia was small. Its only fort of importance was Frederica on St. Simons Island. This fort was garrisoned by a part only of General Oglethorpe's

19. Ricardo Torres-Reyes and Luis R. Arana, "Historical Base Map, Castillo de San Marcos NM, " 1971.

20. Ibid.; See also Appendix maps.

regiment of foot; the remainder of the forces were distributed in the small forts on the other islands commanding the passages and frontiers of Georgia.²¹

21. For further background information see also Alexander Hewatt, An Historical Account of the Rise and Progresses of the Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia (London, 1779), II, pp. 1-74; David Ramsay, History of South Carolina . . . (Newberry, South Carolina, 1858), pp. 1-78; Thaddeus Mason Harris, Biographical Memorials of James Oglethorpe . . . (Boston, 1841), Ch. XIII; George R. Fairbanks, The History and Antiquities of the City of St. Augustine, Florida (New York, 1858), Ch. XIII.

First English Inroads

1. March to the St. Johns

Oglethorpe scarcely needed an excuse or provocation, but a small Spanish raid on territory claimed by Georgia drew the first English blood of the contest that was soon to follow between the rival settlements of Georgia and Florida. At the time of the opening of hostilities, the small Amelia Island was the southern-most Georgia lookout on the so-called Georgia-Florida frontier. Here Oglethorpe had stationed a scout-boat with a crew of 16 men. With their families, these men formed a little settlement of about 40 persons, protected by a palisade and battery of two or three guns. Sometime in October 1739, a small force of English militia and Indians invested the area 50 miles from the mouth of the St. Johns and destroyed several Spanish Indian villages. In retaliation, a Spanish-Indian-Negro patrol landed in the night of November 24 upon Amelia Island and concealed themselves in the woods. On the following morning, they shot two unarmed Highlanders and hacked their bodies with their swords. Though speedily pursued by the English, the raiders escaped by boats.¹

Oglethorpe's reaction to the raid on Amelia Island was to request from the Trustees of the colony the means for strengthening the defenses against a possible Spanish invasion. He also said:

The best expedient I can think of is to strike first. As our strength consists in men, and as the people of the Colony as well as the old soldiers handle their arms well and are desirous of action, I think the best way is to make use of our strength, beat them out of the field, and destroy their plantations, and out-settlements, in which the Indians, who are very faithful, can assist us; and to form the siege of Augustine, if I can get artillery. It is impossible to keep this Province or

1. Gentleman's Magazine (1740), Vol. X, p. 129; Oglethorpe to the Lieutenant-Governor of South Carolina, November 16, 1739, in George Cadogan, The Spanish Hireling Detected . . . (London, 1743), pp. 50-51, 56; CRG, XXXV, p. 123, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, December 31, 1739; Jones, op. cit., p. 323.

Carolina without either destroying Augustine, or keeping horse rangers and scout-boats sufficient to restrain their nimble parties.²

Without giving much thought to the approaching war and the possible need to surprise the Spaniards with a regular invasion, Oglethorpe determined to retaliate for the Amelia incident as soon as he could collect a sufficient number of boats to make an incursion into Florida. Securing about 200 men composed of a detachment from his regiment, some Highlanders, a few rangers, and a body of Chickasaw, Uchees, and Creek Indians, he embarked in the middle of December and made for the St. Johns. A camp was established near the mouth of the river, located about 12 leagues north of St. Augustine. After taking and destroying all the boats he found in the river, he landed on the Spanish mainland, drove in the out-guards and burned three outposts. He then marched in the direction of St. Augustine ravaging the country as far as a few miles from the town. For three days he collected cattle and endeavored to provoke the Spaniards to combat. A detachment of Spanish cavalry, Negroes, and Indians appeared, but retreated rapidly; they were pursued as far as a few miles from the town. Having reconnoitred part of the country leading to St. Augustine and "obliged to retire for want of strength to take" St. Augustine, Oglethorpe decided to retreat lest he might be intercepted on his return to the St. Johns. He, therefore, hastened back to the island of St. George.³

From St. George, Oglethorpe sent Lieutenant George Dunbar with a strong force to discover the situation and strength of the Spanish forts higher up the St. Johns. He was to destroy all the boats he could in order to prevent the Spaniards from crossing the St. Johns. On December 28, Dunbar attacked Fort Picolata, located on the east bank of the river. Dunbar, according to the General, landed in the night and thought to have surprised the fort, "but after several hours firing and three men being wounded he found he could not carry it without cannon, so returned."⁴

Oglethorpe's version of the attack is not in accord with the Spanish account nor with that of Thomas Syre, a member of Dunbar's party:

2. Wright, op. cit., quoting letter of the General to the Trustees, pp. 227-28.

3. CRG, Vol. V, p. 342; SCR, p. X, Doc. 6; Wright, op. cit., pp. 228-29; Jones, op. cit., pp. 323-24.

4. Letters from General Oglethorpe to the Trustees of the Colony and others, from October 1735 to August 1744. Georgia Historical Collections, (Savannah, 1873), Vol. III, p. 106; one of the wounded men, a sergeant, later died. William Stephens, A Journal of the Proceedings in Georgia . . . 1737. Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (Atlanta, 1906), Vol. IV, p. 483.

"We rowed up the River untill the 16th at night, when we came to an Anchor, about 3 in the morning our Indians went a Shore, and by the light of the morn found the Tract of a mans foot, which they pursued untill they discovered the Fort about 4 miles distance from where we lay, we landed and got every thing ready with the Greatest Expedition for the attack, which we made about ten a Clock, the fire continued very hot on both sides for near 3 hours, we were within fifty yards of the Fort without the least Shelter, and the Enemy under Covert, and as we judged by their fire near equal our No. Lieut. Dunbar finding that our Shells the Several of them burst in the Fort did but little Execution, and that Several of our men were wounded, gave orders to go on Board and leave nothing behind, which we did with a great deal of Regularity, and at our Return, gave them a triple discharge of our Arms, which they never returned, and killed their horses within sight of their Fort. This Fort lies on the narrowest pass on the River and here it is at least two miles wide, in no other place less than 7, its banks are Covered with Orange Trees which are loaded with Fruit."⁵

It was not too long before Governor Montiano was informed about the presence of English forces in the environs of the St. Johns. On December 22, 1739, a cavalry soldier, one of those who guarded the bar of the river, informed Montiano that he saw tracks of 25 or 30 men at the creek of Los Cañuelos, halfway between the St. John's bar and St. Augustine. Immediately, another cavalryman of the same guard came in with the news that one of the Spanish Indians had reported having seen the tracks of more than 300 men on the banks of the river. Next day cavalry Ensign Don Lorenzo José De León and a private brought the information that they had actually seen a great number of Indians and white men at Los Cañuelos.⁶

5. Syre to his brother, December 23, 1739, in John M. Goggin, "Fort Pupo: A Spanish Froniter Outpost." The Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (October, 1951), p. 151.

6. EFP, Doc. 180, January 31, 1740.

Montiano thought the English forces would proceed to attack Fort San Diego, 18 or 20 miles north of the town. On December 24 he held a council of war to decide whether it was advisable to demolish Fort Diego or reinforce it, and whether the Spanish forces were sufficiently strong to attack the enemy. It was resolved to send a relief force of 11 men and various works of improvement were begun to secure the defense of the fort. Its garrison was increased with the knowledge that if invested in regular form, the fort would fall readily because of its faulty design; it lacked a ditch and had only two bastions. It was, besides, located a league away from the nearest landing place and could not be succored save at much risk for being located on open and flat country. It was thought expedient not to weaken the garrison of the town by sending a large force to San Diego. Perhaps, the governor realized, the English were using the obvious move of an attack on Fort Diego to lure the Spaniards into sending a force out on the open, where it would be surrounded from the nearby woods, and destroyed. Montiano felt he actually needed more definite information about the enemy's number and intentions.⁷

During the next few days, Montiano took various defensive measures and endeavored to find out the real intentions of the British forces. A trooper and some Indians came in and brought intelligence that they had discovered fresh tracks of 30 men, at a distance of four leagues north of the town. Father Francisco Gómez, parish priest of the Indian village of Ayamón, seven or eight leagues south of St. Augustine, reported that about 10 Uchee Indians had shown themselves in the neighborhood of his place. Ensign Don Alonso was sent to scout the country and collect all the cattle possible and then to cross it by boat to Anastasia Island. Other detachments were ordered to collect horses and cut stakes for strengthening the defenses of the town. Four Indians were sent on a scouting mission with the offer of a cash award if they captured one Englishman or a hostile Indian prisoner.

On December 27, Montiano sent the Indian Juan Ygnacio with five other Indians to observe the movements of the enemy on the St. Johns; other Indians were dispatched to observe the activities of the British by land.

In the night of the 28th, two of the Indians who went with Juan Ygnacio returned with the news that on that day, the fort of Picolata was attacked by 240 Englishmen and Indians (under Lieut. Dunbar) and that the seven-man garrison had gallantly held out against the overwhelming force from ten o'clock in the morning till five in the afternoon, at which hour the attackers made a hasty retreat.

7. EFP, Docs. 180, 181 (January 31).

Next day, Cacique Chislala and eight Indians of his choice went out to scout the country, and were directed to capture a hostile Indian or an Englishman alive. This same day, one of the Spanish soldiers who fought at Picolata arrived with the Indians Juan Ygnacio and Juan Savina. They reported that those who attacked Picolata were 150 Englishmen and 30 Indians, and that the firing lasted four hours; that the only Spanish casualty was the artilleryman who later died of a musket shot. Two of the enemy were seen to fall; one appeared to be an officer for he wore a laced hat and was taken off by four men. According to the soldier, the fort was attacked by two mortars firing large shells. He gave Montiano some fragments of the shells that had fallen within the fort.

Another Spanish version of the attack says that there were 150 Englishmen and Indians. Two of the mortar shells fell inside the fort, "and finished its ruin, shored up as it was and ready to fall." At the first fire, the fort gun was dismounted. "The defenders seeing the bad condition of the fort, abandoned it, fearing the return of the enemy in greater force, or lest it fall upon them."⁸

During the next two weeks the hostile Indians were on the move and busy near the Indian village of Ayamón and the area of the St. Johns. Spanish Indian scouts saw boats and discovered tracks of Indians who had passed back and forth near San Mateo, on the south bank of the river. They made every exertion to discover whether the English Indians had made, or were constructing a fort in the vicinity of the river. They were able to see only boats passing by. Early in January 1740, Cacique Chislala and his scouts discovered the camps (ranchos) where the hostile Indians had been. According to the "signs left behind there were 134 of them [Indians]. They made thirty-six fires, which covered the English, who were, they thought, in number 200."⁹

2. British Control of the St. Johns

During the interim, Lieut. Dunbar, after his unsuccessful attack on Picolata, had returned to Frederica where the news of his reverse served to only elevate "the ardour of the troops and Indians." The latter, particularly, "were clamorous to be led against the enemy who had built on their hunting ground and invaded their territories."¹⁰

8. EFP, Doc. 181.

9. EFP, Docs. 180, 181.

10. Stephens, op. cit., p. 162.

This sentiment found a favorable response with Oglethorpe's own impulse and with no further delay he organized a large military and Indian force. His forces included a detachment of his regiment, various officers and ensigns, the rangers, and Chickasaw, Yuchi, and Creek Indians. The officers of the regular troops included Captains Hugh MacKay and Desbrisay, Lt. Dunbar, and Ensigns Charles MacKay, Shutherland, Maxwell, and Sandford Mace, and Adjutant Hugh MacKay. Among the Indian leaders were Walby of the Creeks, the Squirrel King and Mingo Stobo of the Chickasaw, and the Yuchi King of that tribe.¹¹

About the 10th of January, Oglethorpe embarked in thirteen boats and a privateer sloop, with several pieces of cannon. Sailing up the St. Johns, he sent ahead a party of Indian scouts. At daybreak a week later, two hours before the General and his forces arrived, the Indians suddenly attacked and burned Picolata. Fort Pupo was then invested and twice bombarded with four pieces of artillery. The Indians and the Highland Rangers were commanded by Adjutant Hugh MacKay; the regular troops were under Captains MacKay and Desbrisay, and the artillery under the care of Mace, sub-engineer. After the second bombardment, Pupo is said to have surrendered.

Oglethorpe's description of the attack is the best account available.

At 10 the same day [as the attack on Picolata] I landed and invested Saint Francis de Pupa with the Indians and Rangers, and formed the Regular Troops and landed four pieces of Cannon, posted them and marked out a Battery in such manner that they were sheltered from the sight of the Garrison by the Woods. In the mean time the Indians advanced as near as they could under the shelter of trees, some of which stood within 100 yards of the Fort, but in most places the ground was cleared 300 yards around. The Indians fired very briskly upon the Fort and the Spaniards returned the same very hotly till towards 3 of Clock when their fire lessened considerably. This kept the Spaniards so amused that they did not discover our men at the Batteries so that they worked undiscovered till 5 of clock when the Spaniards began to fire upon them but the Breast work being then finished they did no mischief. Before sun

11. Oglethorpe to Newcastle, January 22, 1739, CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 124.

set the Battery fired on the Fort when I .
offered them terms but they refusing the
Cannons fired a second time which had so
good an effect that they cried out for
Quarter, became Prisoners of War and sur-
rendered the Fort with two Pieces of Cannon,
one Mortar, three Swivel Guns, 150 Shells,
a number of glass bottles filled with Powder,
and artifical Fireworks, a sufficient Quantity
of Ammunition, Provisions, &ca. for long
Defence. ¹²

Oglethorpe himself had a narrow escape at Pupo, barely missing
death from a cannon shot.¹³

Mace, the sub-engineer in charge of the artillery, prepared
a sketch of the capture of Pupo that shows the detailed disposition
of the English troops during the investment. After landing north
of the fort, the General set his batteries--one cannon and the swivel
guns from the boats--directly west of Pupo. Behind the batteries
and eastward along the river were the regular troops, "the Regiment."
To the northeast, on the river bank, and in front of the regiment,
were the Creek Indians under Nicolansa. On the right of the guns,
and forming a semicircle that extended to the river west of the fort,
were the remainder of the forces--another group of Creeks, the Yuchi,
the Chickasaw, the White Rangers, and Hillispilly with the third
group of Creeks. Meanwhile, the boats patrolled the river in front
of the fort.¹⁴

Pupo, according to Oglethorpe, was

a strong new built tower about 30 foot
high, 16 foot square, within with a
manchicolis above, which flanked the
foot of the tower, without that a ram-
part faced with timber a foot thick
and 12 foot high, filled up within
side with 6 foot earth. . . .

12. CRG, Vol. 3, p. 107. Another account by Oglethorpe is found
in Wright, op. cit., pp. 236-37.

13. Capt. MacKay, Jan. 24, 1739, in CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 88.

14. Goggin, op. cit., p. 153.

He admitted that the garrison was very weak, **consisting only** of a sergeant, a corporal, nine soldiers and one Indian. "The Governor having since the first inroad withdrawn the garrison from Picolata and part of that from Pupa, they formerly **consisting of** a commissioner officer and 30 men."¹⁵

The English deep penetration up the St. Johns seems to have been missed by Montiano's **scouts**. For some time he was unaware that Pupo had fallen, the 17th or 18th of January, and that the river was under the British control.

On January 13 a force of 46 Uchises attacked the small village of Ayamón, and "badly wounded and scalped an Indian who was outside of the little fort "that protected the settlement.

Five days later a detachment of Spanish infantry, cavalry and convicts was about to set out to rebuild Picolata, but the men were ordered to suspend their march until the return of Juan Ygnacio who had gone out to reconnoiter the river. He returned the same day and reported having seen, at St. Nicolás, three schooners, two sloops and seven canoes loaded with about 700 men, the greater number dressed in red. Three days later Juan Ygnacio and a party of Indians returned from another scouting mission and reported that they saw Picolata in ashes, and the English vessels near Pupo. "That all about it, were many people in red coats and that the said **fort** was in the hands of the enemy, for they saw many people go out and in, up and down."

Pupo's 11-man garrison, according to Spanish sources, held out for two days under continuous artillery fire until after a salvo of seven guns they capitulated. Montiano was uncertain as to the fate of the garrison, regretting its loss. It appeared to him that Pupo was the objective of the enemy expedition, "and as neither my forces nor its situation were sufficient, nor admitted of sending any support, I undertook nothing from the impossibility of the case."

Lacking details about the activities of the English, Montiano had to base his knowledge only on scout reports. Not a single prisoner had been taken. Scouting operations were very difficult due to the numerous thickets, lagoons and swamps of the St. Johns area. Scouts had to advance through water the greater part of the day, and "absolutely none but Spaniards" could succeed without getting lost. Very few Indian scouts were available, Juan Ygnacio being the most dependable.

On January 22 Diego de Espinosa and six cavalrymen went out to "reconnoiter, and mark the landing places of St. Johns, St. Matheo,

15. Oglethorpe, op, cit., pp. 107-108.

and St. Nicholas". At San Nicolás, the narrowest part of the river, and 16 leagues from the town, he saw three soldier's tents, many people, but not a single boat. This part of the river was shaped like a horseshoe. He endeavored to get closer to find out what the tents contained, but his party was discovered, and he withdrew quickly to a point of safety, "fearing lest they should cut off his retreat."¹⁶

Both the destruction of Picolata and the fall of Pupo were a heavy blow for the Spanish governor. In spite of being of wood, the two small forts had defended themselves at various times against Indian raids. They were strategically located on the east and west banks of the river, where the Indian trail from St. Augustine to Georgia crossed that waterway. Picolata and Pupo gave Oglethorpe control of the navigation of the St. Johns. This control cut off the communication between the Spaniards and the Fort of Apalache, the passage of couriers and friendly Indians, and the drawing of succors from Mexico via West Florida.

Oglethorpe felt that since St. Johns "was the original boundary of Carolina," the building of Fort Pupo by the Spaniards on the north side of the river "was an absolute infraction of the treaties;" that Pupo was the ferry over the river and gave the Spaniards an easy means to invade the Creek Indians and the Province of Carolina.¹⁷

Pupo's capture seemed so significant to the General that he left there a garrison of 40 men and a guard boat under Adjutant MacKay and added to the fortification by laying out "an intrenchment round the fort." In the future, any party of cavalry coming from Carolina would be sheltered at Pupo "til they be ferried over and Picolata, at which they land, is within 21 miles of Augustine, and the country between is full stocked with cattle and horses."¹⁸

Again and again, various English reports emphasized the importance of the two forts in holding the Spanish line to Apalache and discouraging the Creeks. Hugh MacKay wrote that the capture of the two forts "gives likewise entrance to the Creek Indians into Florida which before was cut off by them."¹⁹

16. EFP, Docs. 180, 181.

17. Oglethorpe to Newcastle, Jan. 22, 1739/40, in Wright, op. cit., pp. 235-36.

18. Oglethorpe, op. cit., pp. 107-108; Oglethorpe to Newcastle, Jan. 22, 1739/40, in CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 124; Capt. MacKay, Jan. 24, 1739, in CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 88.

19. MacKay, op. cit.

Spaniards On Guard

1. Plans to Retrieve the St. Johns

Pupo's fall was another heavy burden added to the many other problems of maintaining and defending St. Augustine against a determined English infiltration into Spanish Florida. Montiano had no naval forces to oppose the English from a sea attack and much less to drive them out from the St. Johns. Lacking naval forces, he was unable to send out a large detachment by land to recapture Pupo, because this operation required a strong expedition by sea at the same time. He suspected that, perhaps, the British attacked Picolata and Pupo "as a feint to force" him to send out a large force of troop to defend the forts and leave St. Augustine defenseless.

Montiano's entreaties to the governor of Cuba depict the deteriorating conditions of Saint Augustine at a time when the presidio was under imminent danger. Late in January, he wrote that the residents of the town caused him great annoyance, for most of them were asking permission to go to Habana. They complained of the lack of food and feared continuance of the problem throughout the war. Another objection was the misfortunes and privations resulting from the want of money. The garrison and all other personnel under the government payroll had gone without pay since 1736. At the beginning of 1737 an agent was sent to Mexico for the subsidy, and as yet had not arrived; there was a rumor that he had been shipwrecked or fallen into the hands of the English. Montiano and his officials, however, decided that for the time being no one would be allowed to move to Habana. He felt that the grounds for moving to Habana were sound, "and might induce me to send away hence all useless mouths," but the lack of information as to the existing "differences" between England and Spain, kept him from approving the requests of the residents. Besides, he felt that the King wished the province to be peopled, and it would be "very difficult to make them return once away." He noted also that the burden would be extreme if St. Augustine were besieged because "of the small enclosure of the castle, and the scarcity of food." At the end of the month, however, Montiano received valuable food supplies from Habana, especially corn, but still **needed** meats, vegetables, rice, and cassava.²⁰

20. EFP, Docs. 180, 181, and 182, Jan. 31, 1740. On Feb. 12 Montiano reported that the English had captured the subsidy and taken it to Jamaica; that other **subsidies** were held at Vera Cruz due to the danger of being captured if sent over to St. Augustine. Doc. 184, Feb. 10.

Late in February Montiano reported that the English had occupied with their boats the entire St. Johns, and that their navigation southward was for the purpose of embarrassing the Spanish communication with Apalache, winning over the Uchises, and capturing any mail. To endure this occupation of the St. Johns, wrote the governor, "is a rebuff of His Majesty's sacred honor, a foul stain on his catholic arms, and an insult exciting the rage of our nation." He, therefore, entreated the governor of Cuba to send him galliots with good crews under a mariner of proved valor and skill, to dislodge the English and recover Pupo. Without this help, it was a physical impossibility for him to carry out his plans of defense, "and as a matter of fact we shall see ourselves shut up in a corner, without a single man that dares leave the place for any purpose whatever."

On the St. Johns there was a stretch called Mojoloa, from which all boats trying to go south to succor or attack Pupo, "would be necessarily exposed to musket fire." Although the river was quite wide along Mojoloa, the channel ran very close to the stretch, "the rest being shoal impassable even by a small boat."

Montiano's plan was to build a fort on the stretch of Mojoloa, and arm it with six or seven eight-pounders and a garrison of 50 men in order to shut in Pupo beyond all possibility of succor. The galliots would be used to transport the artillery, free the river of hostile boats, and recover Fort Pupo. These results accomplished, he would bring the galliots, or some of them, to defend the entrance of the harbor. Furthermore, he would strive to induce the greatest number of Indians available to go and settle in the immediate neighborhood of the contemplated fort of Mojoloa, and settlers to go forth with their slaves to continue the cultivation of the plantations.

The English had gone in boats as far as Pirigirigua, 15 leagues south of St. Augustine. There was reason to believe they were seeking an exit to the Keys, "such as it is possible this unknown river may have, and to the Bay of Carlos and Tampa."²¹

After an inspection of the site of Mojoloa, Engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano suggested the narrows of San Nicolás, north of Pupo, as the best place for the fort. Here the ground ran "hard from one bank to the other at musket range and a little more"; the passage could be further closed with the addition of a chain or stockade. According to the turn of events, it could be decided to build another fort on the other side of the river, thus providing for a cross fire, and here establish communications with Apalache. All this could be accomplished only with the aid of sea forces. The main purpose of the new fort and the galliots was to recapture Pupo, make the river safe,

21. EFP, Doc. 187, Feb. 23, 1740.

and relieve St. Augustine of any attempt the English "may make from Picolata, whence the distance to this point is least."²²

Montiano's continued requests for provisions and a naval force must have been annoying to the authorities of Habana. He insisted in the necessity of having small boats for service in the St. Johns in order to compel the British to abandon it. This could be accomplished, he repeated again, by seizing the pass of San Nicolás, one bank or the other, fortifying them as a shelter for the boats, and by closing the river with a stockade or chain of heavy timbers. All this done, he felt sure the English would have either to abandon Pupo, or to allow themselves to be blockaded without the necessity of a siege. "If left alone, however, they will become inexpugnable, especially if the Uchises declare for them, which they will, on seeing our indifference and inaction."

St. Augustine's land forces, as of March 25, were as follows:

Eight companies of reinforcement	308
Three garrison companies	80
One company of artillerymen	32
One company of cavalry	42
One company of militiamen	61
Armed Indians	50
Free Negroes	<u>40</u>
Total	613

The above number did not include the detachment of 80 men stationed at Apalache.

Unfortunately, the failure of the Spaniards to take a single prisoner deprived the governor of knowing what was the strength of the English. He thought, however, that with an addition of 100 mulattoes, 100 Negroes, and 100 militiamen, he could pursue the plan of retrieving the St. Johns. With these extra men, the regulars would be free to be used in other important tasks.²³

It was with great joy that Montiano received, on April 14, six galliots from Habana under the charge of Don Juan Fandino and Don Francisco del Castillo. The next day, broadside guns were mounted on four of them and all were prepared to act immediately. They brought a crew of 122 men, thus increasing the defense forces to 735 men.^{23a}

22. EFP, No. 191, March 24, 1740.

23. EFP, Doc. 192, March 25, 1740.

23a. To the 735 men should be added the convicts, Negroes, and friars who were armed during the siege. Report of Don Antonio Solana, September 12, 1740, in SC-AGI 58-1-32/23.

Little did Montiano realize that the galliots, more than anything else, were eventually to save the city and castle. It was a very fortunate break for the Spaniards that the British sea captain left to guard the inlets of St. Augustine and Matanzas had abandoned his assignment for several days and during the time the galliots had slipped in quietly through the bar of Matanzas.²⁴

2. Besieged by Sea

If Oglethorpe's move against Picolata and Pupo had put Montiano on the alert and encouraged concentration on his part, new fresh events by the sea foreshadowed an imminent demonstration in force against the castle.

On April 18th, two English frigates came in sight from the north. At dawn of the 19th, they were both off the bar of the town, remaining in that neighborhood all day, and sending a boat for water to the vicinity of the point and coast of San Mateo, just north of the harbor. As the boat was resting on its oars, the flagship fired a gun, "and on seeing our two launches making for it, fired another shot. . . ." The boat withdrew.

On the 20th, only one frigate could be seen, and at dawn it was at anchor off the bar. An attempt by the six Spanish galliots and two launches to capture or sink the frigate failed. The frigate and the galliots fired at each other for more than two hours, grapeshot crossing from both sides. It was said that the frigate mounted from 32 to 36 guns; it had a large crew and regular troops in red uniforms. At least, the Spanish artillerist had a "good practice."

After the above incident, a frigate remained constantly in view, apparently the same one the Spaniards tried to capture. Another one was seen from Matanzas, returning probably from a cruise as far as Cabo Cañaveral.²⁵

Prudence and forethought called for the conservation of provisions, for without them, the garrison could not subsist. On April 27, 200 loads of provisions and supplies arrived from Habana. Provisions had to be rationed to the garrison and reinforcement troops, widows, orphans, crew of the galliots, convict labor working in the royal works, and 22 religious.

24. EFP, Docs. 193, 194, April 27; SCR, p. XXI.

25. EFP, Docs. 193-94, April 27, 1740.

An inventory of May 6 disclosed that the provisions available for the month of June were as follows:

Half loads of flour	200
Boxes of pork and beef	192
Barrels of " and "	57
Twenty-five-pound weights of rice	162
Barrels of flour	13
Twenty-five-pound weights or hard-tack	234
Bushels of Corn	22

As of May 9, there were 2062 persons in St. Augustine who professed the Christian faith, of whom 1046 were receiving rations. Flour was the main item of support, followed by cassava, meats, rice, vegetables, and hard-tack. It was estimated that the 1046 persons consumed 780 "loads" of cassava every month, at the rate of 20 ounces daily. Due to the shortage of food, the desertion of troops got worse. The total town population exceeded 2400.²⁶

There were many other mouths which, out of charity, had to be fed, especially Indians. Since early in the year, the Indians who had settlements near St. Augustine began a withdrawal to the town. Some were afraid of the British, and others feared the Uchises who came down to the southern coast and north of the town looking for slaves.

On May 9 there were 366 Indians taking shelter in St. Augustine, including adults and children. These Indians came from the following villages:

Nombre de Dios	43
San Antonio de la Costa	22
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe	
de Tolomato	29
San Juan del Puerto de Palica	52
Nuestra Señora de la Concepción	
de Pocotalaca	44
Nuestra Señora del Rosario de la	
Punta	51
Santo Domingo de Inguibo (?)	55
San Nicolás Cacepuvas (?)	70
Total	366 ²⁷

26. EFP, Doc. 194, April 27; Doc. 197, May 9; Doc. 198, May 13; Stetson Collection, 87-3-12, Inventory of Provisions, May 6, 1740 (hereafter SC).

27. "Lista del número de Indios de los pueblos que se hallan en estas cercanías agregados a esta plaza," SC, 87-3-12.

Besieged by sea, wrote Montiano on May 13, the town was in extreme want and without food in the event of a long siege. Four days before, one sloop was sent to Habana and another to Guarico to buy flour and other stores. The first was fired upon by a frigate, driven aground about two or three leagues beyond the bar of Mosquitos, and captured.²⁸

Since there was a frigate and a dispatch boat on the bar of St. Augustine, and another frigate situated in the channel off Cabo Cañaveral, no small boats sent from Habana could reach the town safely. Under these circumstances, a meeting was held and it was decided to send a galliot to Habana with the above news. Montiano requested Güemes to supply St. Augustine with the greatest possible amount of supplies in vessels which would be strong enough to cope with the three English vessels on the nearby coast, "for in no other way do I see any help, and consequently an irreparable calamity is hanging over us." Other than the galliots, there was no other force to defend the entrance of the harbor and the bar of Matanzas. The English were also holding the Key West coast, perhaps in an attempt to cut off assistance to Apalache from Habana.²⁹

On the 15th, when the galliot was about to sail for Habana with urgent dispatches from the governor, it had to be called back. The Spanish sloop captured several days before had been fitted out by the English with a new crew and posted leeward of the bar of Peñón, very close to the shore. Rather than risking the galliot, Montiano arranged to send a Spaniard and three Indians in a small canoe to the Keys, by the intracoastal channel, where it would be easy for the Indians to take the little canoe across the shoals. On arriving at Biscayne Key or at Matacumbe, they would take a fishing boat to transport them to Habana. Failing to find a fishing boat, they were to request the friendly Cacique Don Diego to undertake the trip himself.³⁰

28. Captain Warren, commander of the frigate, found on board the sloop a letter of Montiano in which he advised Güemes that Oglethorpe had taken Pupo and Picolata, and that he therefore expected a siege; he pressed for an immediate supply of provisions, ammunition, and other supplies to enable him to maintain the place. SCR, Doc. 25.

29. EFP, Doc. 198, May 13, 1740.

30. One of the Indians returned to St. Augustine on June 4 with three gunshot wounds; the Indians of Mayaca slew the soldier and the two other Indians at Gega. EFP, Doc. 201, June 11, 1740.

Unless the two English frigates, the dispatch boat and the sloop withdrew from the coast, wrote Montiano, no reports could be sent to Habana nor small boats in search of supplies. Provisions were running short, but only strong vessels, which were not available, could sail through the uncertain and dangerous waters of the Keys.

"I have no expedient left," wrote the governor, "that is of any value and unless help can come by June 20 at the latest, it is the most natural thing in the world that this garrison perish."³¹

Five days later--June 20--Oglethorpe began the formal invasion of Florida.

31. EFP, No. 199, May 14; No. 200, May 15, 1740.

Invasion of Florida

1. First Operations

After leaving a garrison at Fort Pupo to assume the control of the St. Johns, Oglethorpe had returned to Frederica sometime late in January to continue with the raising of troops and to obtain armaments for the reduction of St. Augustine.

From the best information he could obtain--the prisoners taken at Pupo and other sources--the General ascertained that the Castillo de San Marcos at that time consisted of a structure built of soft stone, with four bastions and bomb proof casemates; the ditch was 40 feet wide and 12 feet deep, six of which sometimes were filled with water; the counterscarp was faced with stone. The armament consisted of 50 cannons--16 of bronze and among them some 24-pounders; the garrison had been for some time working upon a covered way, but this was still in an unfinished condition. The town was protected by a line of intrenchments with ten salient angles, in each of which small field pieces were mounted.¹

All the forces in Florida, "as per establishment," and according to Oglethorpe's sources, not counting Indians and militia, were as follows:²

1 troop of horse	100 men
1 company of artillery	100 "
3 companies of regular garrison	300 "
2 companies of the Regiment of Asturias	106 "
1 company " " " " Valencia	53
" " " " Catalonia	53
2 companies of " " " Cantabrial	106
" " " " Murcia	106
Armed Negroes	200
Total	1124

1. The line of intrenchments was the Rosario and Cubo Lines, which enclosed the town on the north, west and south; the salient angles were redoubts.

2. SCR, p. 12; Docs. 9-10; Oglethorpe to Newcastle, April 30, 1740, CRG, XXXV, p. 143; Oglethorpe, op. cit., p. 109. The above figures about the Spanish forces are exceedingly high; 735 is the correct figure.

He also had private intelligence from St. Augustine that the place was so much in the utmost want of provisions, that he was certain a great part of the garrison would desert to him as soon as he appeared in the town. The want of provisions was in the strongest manner confirmed by letters found on board a sloop captured by Captain Peter Warren off St. Augustine, bound to Habana, "giving a most melancholy account thereof," and also by three Spanish deserters from St. Augustine. Oglethorpe was in great hopes of taking the town. He thought its 2500-odd people, men, women, and children, if forced to take shelter in the castle, would cause so much distress that "being immediately followed with the throwing in several bombs would undoubtedly produce a speedy surrender." Commodore Vincent Pearse, who promised to give the General all the assistance in his power, said that if the town was attacked, "he would answer for it the place should have no relief by sea, and that they ought all to be hanged if they did not take it in a very short time."³

For the expedition, South Carolina agreed to raise a regiment of 600 men, a troop of rangers--which could not be procured--presents for the Indians, provisions, ammunitions and necessaries. A company of Volunteers, under Captain Richard Wright, was also organized, consisting of 55 men, including 15 Negroes and eight Indians. A large schooner, with a crew of 54 men, and conveying 14 carriage guns (two nine-pounders and 12 four-pounders) was also furnished. Colonel Alexander Vander Dussen was in command of the Carolina forces, but **he** was to proceed under the General's direction during the time of action.⁴

Besides 400 men from his regiment, Oglethorpe raised in Georgia one troop of Highland Rangers on horseback, one troop of English Rangers also on horseback, **one** company of Highland foot, **one** company of English foot, and hundreds of Creek and Uchee Indians from western Georgia and modern Alabama.⁵

Oglethorpe's original purpose is not clearly stated anywhere in his extensive correspondence. It can only be surmised here and there in some of his dispatches. With 400 regular troops of his regiment, Georgia rangers (cattle hunters), and such additional forces as South Carolina could contribute, he was to advance directly upon St. Augustine, and attack by land while a small fleet under

3. SCR, pp. 15-16; Oglethorpe to Newcastle, Charlestown, April 1, 1740, in Wright, pp. 239-40. See also Oglethorpe to Newcastle, April 30, 1740, in CRG, XXXV, p. 143.

4. SCR, pp. 17-18; Docs. 17, 19, 21, 42; Wright, op. cit., p. 241.

5. Oglethorpe to the Secretary of State, April 30, 1740, in Wright, op. cit. p. 242; Jones, op. cit., p. 329.

Commodore Pearse would cut off relief from the sea. He would then summon the castle to surrender, or surprise it. Conceiving that the castle would be too small to afford convenient shelter for more than 2000 men, women, and children of the town, he regarded the capitulation of the fortress as not improbable. Should it refuse to surrender, he proposed to shower the castle with "Granado-shells from the coehorns and mortars, and send for the artillery and pioneers and the rest of the aid promised by the assembly;⁶ also for mortars and bombs from Providence." If the castle should not have yielded prior to the arrival of "these aids," he was resolved to open trenches and conduct a siege which he considered would be all easier, the garrison having been weakened by the summer's blockade.⁷

It was agreed upon in Charleston, between Oglethorpe, the Commodore, and Col. Vander Dussen, to have a council of war and plan together the measures for undertaking the conquest of St. Augustine. St. George's Island, on the north side of the St. Johns, was the place fixed for the rendezvous of the forces and the council of war.⁸

Oglethorpe secured two British men-of-war, the Phoenix and the Flamborough, which he loaded with mortars, bombs, ammunition, etc., from Frederica. Then in May 1740, he set out for Florida following the route of the inland passage. To transport his men, he collected a fleet of small boats which included sloops, schooners, pirogues, scout boats, and others.⁹ In six days the General wound up his way through the creeks and marshes that intervened between Frederica and St. Johns Bluff, three miles above the river's mouth--the agreed place of rendezvous.¹⁰

On May 20, without waiting for Vander Dussen and Commodore Pearse, and without concerting a plan of operations with them, Oglethorpe crossed the St. Johns with the troops he had at St. George's Island and established

6. Of South Carolina.

7. Oglethorpe to Lieut-Governor Bull, March 27, 1740, Cadogan, op. cit., pp. 59-61; Oglethorpe to Newcastle, April 1, 1740, in Wright, op. cit., p. 240; SCR, Doc. 17.

8. SCR, Doc. 25.

9. Oglethorpe to Newcastle, April 30, 1740, CRG, XXXV, p. 137.

10. Georgia Historical Collections (Savannah, 1844), I, p. 267 (hereafter GHC).

a camp upon the south side of the river. His forces at this time consisted of about 220 men from his regiment, including an independent company of Highlanders, about 125 men who had arrived from the Carolina Regiment, and 103 Indians of which nine were Creeks and the rest Cherokees. "Captain-Lieut." Maxwell, of the Carolina detachment, was the only field officer on the spot.¹¹ A 50-man Indian reconnaissance party was sent south towards St. Augustine. Eventually, the party came upon Diego de Espinosa and some of his laborers working on the fields at San Diego, surrounded them and fired a volley of musketry. Despite the wounding of a cavalry soldier and a slave, Espinosa's men managed to get inside Fort Diego except a slave from San Francisco Convent who took to the woods. The reconnaissance party withdrew, later captured the runaway slave, and reached the British camp late that night. It reported having seen a fort about half-way to St. Augustine; the Negro informed them that four galliots were fitted and manned at St. Augustine for the St. Johns.¹²

Next day in the morning, Oglethorpe marched out with 200 men from his regiment, 100 from the Carolina troops, and 100 Indians, together with a four-pounder, some swivel guns, and six days' provisions. Their mission was to attack Fort Diego, the fort the Indian scouts had seen the day before. That night he encamped at a place on the sea beach called La Canela, about 16 miles south of his **main camp**, where the Spaniards had once had a lookout. Here he was forced to leave the guns, "the sands being deep, having no horses to draw them, and the men being unable to carry them further." Capt. Lieutenant Maxwell was sent with a party of the regular troops and of the Carolina Regiment and Captain Brown with a party of Cherokee Indians to invest the fort.

Meanwhile, Espinosa had sent one of his overseers to St. Augustine to inform the governor about the incident of the previous day.

Maxwell and Brown arrived near San Diego about the middle of the night. They approached as near as they could and at daybreak of the 22nd the British attacked the fort and burned a house nearby, but the Spaniards fired so strongly upon them that they were obliged to retire. However, at 10 o'clock in the morning the General came up with the whole body of troops. He sent out Indians to hunt for Spanish horses and cattle, and rode around to view the fort. The Spaniards continued firing while the night fell, when the British surrounded the place with guards and sentries.

11. Vander Dussen embarked on board the Flamborough with Pearse on the 20th and set sail the 23rd of May. SCR, p. 18.

12. EFP, Doc. 201, June 11/40; SCR, p. 18, Docs. 22 and 23.

On the morning of May 23, Oglethorpe sent in one of his Spanish prisoners with a drum to summon the garrison to surrender, "upon which they offered to treat." The following articles of capitulation were agreed on:

- (1) delivery of the fort, cannon, and stores, and treatment as prisoners of war for the garrison.
- (2) retention of individual baggage, thereby the British giving up claim to plunder.
- (3) retention by Diego de Espinosa, the fort's owner, of those slaves, land, and any other effects belonging to him that had not been already plundered in the field.
- (4) all deserters and runaways from Carolina should not have the benefit of the capitulation, but should "be surrendered to Discretion."

Having accepted the four articles of capitulation, the Spanish garrison marched out. It consisted of 50 men, including Espinosa and some Negroes. Inside the fort the British found **nine** swivel guns, two large carriage guns, some powder, bullets and 70 small arms, the latter of which were given to the Indians.

As soon as the fort was taken, an alarm came that its relief was coming by water and land. Oglethorpe marched to meet them, but going to the "landing-place," about three miles from the fort, he only found two large launches of 20 oars each that had been abandoned by the Spaniards. The Indians discovered some horsemen, followed them on their track, but had to abandon the chase when they reached the thick underbrush, yet they caught about 40 or 50 horses.

San Diego was within four hours' march of St. Augustine. It was located 18 to 20 miles north of the town and three miles from the head of the North River or its landing site. The land around consisted mostly of **fine** savannas with fresh water ponds. It was properly a cowpen belonging to the mulatto **Espinosa**, one of the wealthiest residents of the town. He kept a large stock of **cattle** in the farm, and frequently supplied the garrison with **beef**; fine wheat and vines grew on the farm. For his own safety and that of his six Negro slaves, he erected a palisade of cedar posts around his ranch house, 15 feet high, with two bastions or flankers opposite each other, but no ditch without. Lately the governor of St. Augustine had spared him a sergeant and 16 men to defend the house-fort in case of need. These men were relieved weekly by the same

number. By coincidence, the relieving party came to the fort the night before it was invested, and this explains why so many men were taken prisoner when the fort was surrendered.

Oglethorpe's plan was to maintain the fort in order to secure his communications with the St. Johns and use it as a base of operations for staging his intended attack on St. Augustine. All his activities during the next three weeks were directed toward that end.

After taking possession of the fort, he **strengthened it by ordering** the construction of an earthwork around it, the trace of which he personally marked on the ground. He left Lieut. Dunbar in it with a garrison of 50 men, and departed with a mounted escort for the camp, leaving the rest of his force and the prisoners to march leisurely after him. On May 31 the prisoners reached the St. Johns camp and some were confined in the British warships and others in the Carolina transports. Later, a few of the latter escaped.¹³

Meanwhile, since the 26th, Oglethorpe had begun stocking provisions in San Diego and moving new troops to the fort as soon as they arrived in the St. Johns camp, with practically no opposition. On the 27th, as he was marching with a convoy of troops and provisions within sight of the fort, Spanish Indians fired and killed a servant who was leading the General's horse, and cut off his head. With the Highlanders and troops, he entered the woods on foot and pursued the Indians until they were forced to drop the head. He followed them to Fort Mose, within two miles of St. Augustine. There appeared two Spanish launches on the river and a body of cavalry and foot soldiers, but they retired as soon as the English came within two miles of them. The rangers pursued and caught 30 horses and took possession of several Spanish houses which the General preserved from burning. Some of them were very spacious and good buildings, fit for quarters for the sick. One of Oglethorpe's horses was killed, "and his cloak shot through in several places." They all returned to San Diego the same night, having marched from 36 to 40 miles that day.

On the 29th, nine days after Oglethorpe had landed on Florida, Commodore Pearse and Col. Vander Dussen on board the Flamborough and Capt. Fanshaw on the Phoenix, arrived and anchored near the bar of the St. Johns. The Commodore had left Sir Yelverton Peyton in the Hector and Capt. Warren in the Squirrel to block up the bar of St. Augustine. Oglethorpe went on board the flagship and returned

13. SCR, pp. 18-20; Docs. 22-23; EFP, Doc. 181, January 31/40; Luis R. Arana, "Fort San Diego," El Escribano (October 1971), pp. 139-48. According to Oglethorpe 57 men surrendered at Fort Diego. CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 149, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, May 14 and May 15, 1740.

with Pearse on shore. But for unknown reasons, no council of war was held between Oglethorpe, Pearse and Vander Dussen to concert a plan of action. As a matter of fact, no council of war was held between the three leaders during the whole expedition.¹⁴

2. Reconnaissance and Provocation

On May 31, at the camp of the St. Johns, and at two in the morning, the General ordered "to beat to arms." He informed Vander Dussen that he had received an account that the Spaniards had sallied out of town in order to attack Fort Diego, and that they had actually invested the place. Major Heron was detached away immediately with some 50 men and the rest ordered to be ready to march at daybreak with six day's provisions. About eight in the morning Oglethorpe marched out with about 250 more men of his regiment, including the Highland Company, and 100 Indians along the sea shore. Col. Vander Dussen followed two hours later with about 250 men of the Carolina Regiment. The march was so hard and the day so hot, that several men fainted for want of water and dropped by the way; **two** of the General's men died on the march. **At La Canela the troops of both regiments halted** until about sunset. But the General himself, with the Highland Company, marched on, overtook Major Heron and arrived in sight of Fort Diego before sunset. Having sent a detachment ahead to see what was going on, they brought word that it was a false alarm. Just before sunset the remaining troops renewed their march from **La Canela with** the four-pounder which the General had left there in the sands, ten days before; now it was drawn by 20 men. They moved along the sea shore for about a mile, then struck up from the sea, directly mounting with the four-pounder over a high ridge of sand. Espinosa, who had been left by the General as a guide to the troops, although the distance they had to travel was but nine miles, misled them so far of the way that they did not reach Fort Diego until one in the morning.¹⁵

On June 1, Oglethorpe, with Vander Dussen, Lieut. Col. Cook, Major Heron and Capt. Norbury, and with some Highlanders and Indians, went from Fort Diego towards the town to reconnoiter the point of land near the bar. They went on with such speed for such hot weather, that the Indians left the party before it got half way; the Highlanders dropped down by the way, one dying on the march. Lieutenant Col. Cook and Capt. Norbury, advanced in years and affected by the excessive

14. SCR, p. 20, Doc. 22.

15. SCR, p. 21; Docs. 22, 24-26.

heat and lack of water, had to return to Fort Diego. But the General, Vander Dussen and Heron kept on and reached **within a league of St. Augustine**, in sight of the island of **Anastasia**. After viewing the ground, they went back to **Fort San Diego** about two in the morning, heartily fatigued.¹⁶

A few days later, Oglethorpe sent to St. Augustine two of the Spanish prisoners which he had taken at Fort San Diego with several letters to encourage men of that garrison to desert to his army. Thomas Wright, Commissary to the Carolina forces, was against the idea of sending the prisoners to the town because they would provide the Spaniards with information about the "real strength and numbers and also our situation and the posture and conditon" of the British forces. Wright's advice was ignored, and the prisoners never returned.¹⁷

News about the British activities traveled very slowly. It was not until June 4, with the arrival of Espinosa's overseer in St. Augustine, that Montiano was informed about the first incident at Fort Diego two weeks earlier. But still unaware that the fort was in British hands, he resolved to send a sergeant, 12 men, and a surgeon to bring back the wounded, and if necessary, to reinforce the place with a few of the men. The failure of the sergeant to return after two days prompted Montiano to dispatch a cavalry corporal with six men to find out what had happened or was happening at Fort San Diego. He returned the next day without having been able to reach the fort because the enemy scouting patrols were everywhere. The governor sent other scouts, but none brought definite information to confirm if the fort had been taken or was still holding out.

Probably on June 7, a council of war discussed the situation and resolved to send a 300-man detachment of regular soldiers, militiamen, Indians, and Negroes under Captains Don Miguel de Ribas, Don Fulgencio de Alfaro, and Don Pedro Lamberto Hommuytiner. They would be transported in four of the six galliots that had arrived from Habana in April, one launch, and four pirogues, "and carry two guns in case it was necessary to batter the fort, demolish a side of it, and recover or succor it."

Unknown to the Spaniards, Oglethorpe marched out of Fort San Diego in the evening of June 7 with about 100 men from his regiment, seven Carolina Volunteers, and a party of Indians. Marching south all night he reached, at daybreak on the 18th, a point five or six miles north of St. Augustine. Halting the party within a quarter of a mile distance from five scattered houses, he ordered Lieut. Bryan with the six other Volunteers under him to march up and attack

16. SCR, p. 21-22; Docs. 25 and 27.

17. SCR, Doc. 23.

the houses. They entered and searched every one of them, and brought back two Negro prisoners.

On the morning of the same day (8th), apparently, the Spanish detachment began moving toward Fort San Diego, but when the commanders were informed that the enemy had superior numbers and was waiting in formation, they returned to St. Augustine.¹⁸

An incident occurred between Oglethorpe and the Volunteers when the latter were searching the Negro houses that shows the disdain the British regular officers had for the provincial soldiers. Not satisfied because some other Negroes had escaped from the houses, the General said to the Volunteers: "Well, I see the Carolina Men have courage but no conduct [leadership and discipline]"; to this Lieut. Bryan replied: "Sir, the Conduct is Yours."

The Carolina Volunteers had also other grievances against the General. According to one of Oglethorpe's stipulations, all the Negroes deserted from South Carolina and captured in Florida during the expedition were returnable to the owners upon paying five pounds sterling to the captors. The Volunteers offered to pay Oglethorpe either one half of the salvage and keep the two slaves or to receive one half and give them up to him, but the General, claiming the slaves were his property, refused both offers and "took them to himself." It seems Oglethorpe had also taken away at Fort San Diego from those Volunteers several horses which they had caught to carry their baggage. Besides, though beef was very abundant at Fort San Diego, it was with great difficulty that the Volunteers obtained provisions, "being generally left to shift for themselves."¹⁹

There was dissatisfaction among the Indians too. Many of the Creeks, headed by Thomas Jones, complained that they were tired with fatigue after spending nearly three weeks, days and nights, ranging "backward and forward" without any prospect of attacking St. Augustine. Disheartened, they returned home. It seems Oglethorpe had ordered Jones to stay out with the Indians constantly scouting the country. They were to watch the movements of the Spaniards and to endeavor to take some prisoners. He was positively instructed not to permit the Indians to destroy any houses. The Cherokees also grew uneasy, and were disgusted because the General had shown some anger for their killing some cattle at Fort San Diego, and would not permit them to do it. Caesar, one of their headmen, said "it was a strange

18. EFP, Doc. 201, Jan 11/40; Arana, op. cit.

19. SCR, p. 23; Docs. 28, 30, 37.

thing that they were permitted to kill the Spaniards but not their cattle and threatened to carry all his men home."²⁰

Oglethorpe withdrew from the environs of St. Augustine on June 9, reaching Fort San Diego late that night. From the two captured Negroes he had found out that the people in the town were in a starving condition.²¹

About the same day, a Spanish scout informed Montiano that the British patrols were coming as close as three miles to St. Augustine, and that they were fortifying San Diego and establishing storehouses there for "food and stores in preparation for the siege" of the town. Montiano had no longer doubts that the fort was in the enemy's possession, that the force was rather strong in numbers, and that Fort San Diego would be the base from which the siege would be launched. He so informed Habana on June 11.

Montiano's apprehensions were further strengthened by the appearance of five vessels, on June 11, in addition to the two that had been watching the bars of St. Augustine and Matanzas for a long time. But as long as the bar of Matanzas was not occupied by the British, wrote Montiano on June 11, "there yet remains a means of succor."²²

20. SCR, p. 24; Docs. 28, 32. Oglethorpe had made an agreement with Espinosa by which the latter supplied the British with beef at the same price he had received from St. Augustine; he also received a special price per head for hunting cattle that did not belong to him. SCR, Doc. 23.

21. SCR, p. 24; Doc. 30.

22. EFP, Doc. 201, June 11/40; Arana, op. cit.

Siege and Blockade

1. Land Approach

With the withdrawal of Oglethorpe to Fort San Diego on June 9, the preliminaries of his invasion of Florida were over. He thus began to move toward the main objective. The two captured Negroes had informed him that the Spaniards planned to place their Indians and Negroes in ambuscade at some distance from the town, "and that their troops were to sally out upon the appearance of" the British troops.

In the evening of June 10, Ensign Mace and a detachment of 42 men from both regiments were sent to take position on Augustine Point (Vilano Beach), called Point Quartell by the British. Next day Vander Dussen was ordered to prepare his regiment and be ready to march with five days' provisions to reconnoiter the town and castle, because the information the General had about them was not reliable.¹

On June 11, in the evening, the General marched out of his camp at San Diego about 300 men--including the Highland Company and rangers--with the Indians, taking along the four-pounder drawn by soldiers. A Spanish Negro called by Oglethorpe Capt. Jack, who had escaped from St. Augustine to San Diego, was the guide for the army. Vander Dussen followed with about 400 men of his regiment, including Volunteers and Cadets. The march was tedious on account of the many palmetto roots, marshes and creeks, and the narrow path made it difficult to carry the gun; they were forced to make causeways for dragging the piece. About one in the morning the whole army halted by a run of water about 12 miles distant from St. Augustine, and laid on their arms all the rest of the night.²

After resting until about four in the afternoon, the army renewed its march with the same difficulties of moving through runs and marshes. At night they were struck by a great storm of thunder, lightning and rain, but continued marching in complete darkness until they came to some palmetto houses, where they rested for about an hour. When the army marched again at midnight, the little gun was left behind.³

1. SCR, p. 24; Doc. 33.

2. SCR, pp. 24-25; Docs. 25, 33, 34.

3. SCR, p. 25; Doc. 35.

June 13 is the date that Montiano regarded as the beginning of the siege. Early in the morning of that day, the marching army came to a dividing path within two miles of St. Augustine, one way leading to the town and the other to Fort Mose. At a point a little way off to the left of the fort, the army halted. Here Colonel Palmer, a Volunteer with a provincial commission, offered to lead 200 Carolinians and a party of Indians and burn the town. Palmer was well acquainted with the immediate environs of St. Augustine, the Indian trails, and ranging in the woods. In 1728 he had led an expedition from South Carolina against the Spanish Indians, but could not penetrate the outer defense line north of the castle. Oglethorpe refused Palmer's suggestion, saying that it was "too hot-headed or hazardous an action, and that it was so long since he was there he had forgot the situation of the town;" that the Negro deserter (Capt. Jack) had given him "another account which must be righter." He further said that "he knew what he had to do; that it was the custom of armies always to shew themselves to the enemy first and to make a feint."

It seems Palmer had several times proposed the burning of the town, but Oglethorpe always refused it, often saying that "he would not by any means have the town burnt," that the houses would be useful to him. Palmer was offended because Oglethorpe valued more the advice of Capt. Jack and ignored his opinions. At one time the General sent for Col. Palmer to ask his opinion about some matters, but Palmer refused to go, "saying he had already advised the General to the best of his knowledge, which he had not regarded, and that he might send for his Negro counsellor."⁴

Renewing the march, the General took the left hand path and just about daybreak occupied Fort Mose, which had been abandoned by the Spaniards. This fort was about 18 miles south of San Diego and within two miles distance and in full sight of St. Augustine. It was in the middle of a plantation, and intended to afford the safety of the former English slaves from the Indians. The fort was a four square with a flanker at each corner, banked round with earth, and had a yucca-lined moat all around. It had a lookout, and a house and well within its walls. Prior to the siege, Montiano had ordered the evacuation of the Mose village and fort. All the residents were withdrawn to the city to spare them the danger to which they might be exposed during the expected attack.⁵

As soon as the English forces were observed from the castle, the Spaniards fired some of the guns at them. At eight or nine o'clock,

4. SCR, p. 25; Docs. 36-38, 28.

5. SCR, p. 25; Doc. 39; Luis R. Arana, "The Mose Site," October 19, 1967.

Oglethorpe and Vander Dussen went to reconnoiter the castle, and ordered the drums with a party to advance a good distance towards it "and there to beat the Grenadier's march, which they answered with some cannon and their drums."

Oglethorpe and Vander Dussen found the castle to be a regular fortification, and very strong, and with a great many new additions. Both agreed that it would be impracticable to attack the castle upon the land side without the requisite pioneer corps and heavy train of **artillery** that had to be brought by land. They observed that Point Quartell, lying north of the bar, and "separated from the Negro Fort by a creek," would be a fit place for a battery that would secure a communication with the men-of-war blockading the harbor.

At the same time, about eight o'clock in the morning, Lieut. Jonathan Bryan and three or four of the rangers went up near to the town and brought back three horses. He perceived that the town was in a great "tumult and confusion," with the inhabitants "screeching and crying." He so informed the General. Upon hearing him talk about withdrawing the forces, Bryan asked Oglethorpe if it was not best to attack the town then; that "that was the time to do it, for that if he retreated they would make preparations against his return." To this the General replied "that if he attempted to storm the town, he should loose 300 men." The men in general expressed a desire to attack the town. If attacked, it might have been taken, according to Vander Dussen, because deserters "from thence afterwards said the Governour had ordered the inhabitants in case of an attack to go into the castle."⁶

Another incident happened that further strained the relations between Oglethorpe and the provincial officers. In the afternoon of the same day, while camped at Fort Mose, a violent shower of rain fell. Some of the Volunteers and officers of the Carolina Regiment, including Col. Palmer, took shelter in the large and comfortable house of the fort where some of the General's officers and men were. Oglethorpe reprimanded the sentinel at the door, "saying he deserved a thousand lashes for letting them in, caused them all to turn out again in that weather."⁷

In the dusk of the evening--still June 13--Oglethorpe went out again from Mose towards the castle with about 150 men and many drums. Being at a great distance from each other, the drums beat a march in several parties. This created confusion in the fort and the Spaniards fired their great guns and small arms, "thinking there was an intent

6. SCR, pp. 25-26; Docs. 28, 25, 39, 40.

7. SCR, p. 26; Docs. 28, 37.

to attack them." His action, he explained, was to disturb the Spaniards and "to hinder them from disturbing us." After this show of pretended courage or defiant confidence, the General returned to Mose. That night, one of his men deserted to the Spaniards.⁸

Oglethorpe's apparent irrational behavior--showing off in front of the Castillo without at least a single siege gun and beating the drums--is understood only in the light of eighteenth century customs of war. His conduct had certainly put the Spaniards on guard.

-- Sea Approach

At sunrise of June 14, Oglethorpe marched back to Fort Diego with drums beating and colors flying. Before departing, he made Fort Mose no longer useful as a fortification by ordering his men to burn its gate, make two breaches in the walls and burn the house inside. This was done, lest--as he playfully but too prophetically said--"it might one day or other be a mousetrap for some of our own people."⁹ Being out of provisions, the men willingly performed a hard march, but many of the General's own men, greatly fatigued and hungry, gave out and dropped upon the march. Oglethorpe gave orders to shoot any man who should lag behind. This order, however, was not put in execution by the officers.

When they reached Fort San Diego before sunset, Ensign Mace had returned from his post at Point Quartell. Two days before, he informed, he had seen six English men-of-war and a sloop come to before St. Augustine bar. About the same time the Wolf and Spence sloops-of-war were lying off the Palmetto Hut south of the bar of St. Johns. Mace had abandoned his post when two Spanish galliots with a large crew of men, discovered his presence and sailed towards the Point.¹⁰

On June 16, all the first party of Volunteers then at Fort San Diego--except Col. Barnwell who stayed and acted as an Aide de Camp to the General and one Mr. Steads--returned to St. Johns and went home. They were disgusted with the slighted manner in which Oglethorpe treated them and disappointed in their expectations of attacking St. Augustine, "having met with nothing but perpetual marches, and scant allowance of provisions, and that fetched twenty-five miles upon men's backs."¹¹

8. SCR, p. 26; Doc. 39.

9. Lieut. Col. Alexander Heron, Sept. 24, 1742, in Wright, op. cit., p. 248.

10. SCR, pp. 26-27; Docs. 25, 28, 41.

11. SCR, p. 27; Docs. 28, 37, 42.

That same day Vander Dussen was ordered by Oglethorpe to march with what number of men of his regiment he had at Fort San Diego and take possession of Point Quartell. Many of his officers were absent and some of the men were at St. Johns picking up some supplies. Accordingly, early in the evening, he marched with provisions and tents on the men's backs. They proceeded down to the sea and then marched south along the beach till about 12 o'clock when they halted to rest. Next day, at six in the morning, they reached Point Quartell--in sight of St. Augustine and supposedly within cannon shot--and encamped behind a ridge of sand hills.

Four British men-of-war appeared then in sight lying off the bar--the Flamborough, Hector, Squirrel and Phoenix--and three more were lying off the Palmetto Hut on the St. Johns--the Tartar, Wolf and Spence. Six Spanish galliots were anchored under the Castillo. Each of the galliots, as the English were informed later, "rowed with twenty oars, and had a cashoo piece or nine-pounder in the bow, some swivel guns fore and aft, and thirty men and two officers."¹²

In the afternoon, the sentry on the hill behind which the regiment was encamped, warned that three of the galliots were moving down to the Point. Thinking that they were to land men and attack him, Vander Dussen ordered the regiment under arms and marched along the beach in their direction. Directed by the colors, the galliots fired in alternate order but all the shots fell short. The Colonel halted the regiment, and realizing that the galliots had no intentions of landing men, ordered his men to the "right about" and marched slowly back till they got under cover. Having fired about 20 shots the galliots retired back to the Castillo.¹³

By the fire of the galliots, Commodore Pearse became aware that the South Carolina Regiment had taken post at Point Quartell. He sent three boats ashore--on June 17--with his Lieutenant and those of the Phoenix and Hector, to acquaint the Colonel with the resolution of a council of war held by the commanders of the men-of-war on board the Flamborough. It seems that Oglethorpe, having neglected to concert a definite plan of operation, had requested Pearse to state how long the ships could stay upon the coast of St. Augustine and what assistance the men-of-war could give towards the reduction of the presidio. It was agreed by the naval council of war that the fleet could not stay near the harbor longer than July 16 due to the dangers of the approaching hurricane season. The naval commanders, therefore, proposed that if Oglethorpe besieged the Castillo and provided 200 men from his regiment,

12. The six galliots had only a total of 122 men and officers. EFP, Doc. 194, April 27.

13. SCR, pp. 27-28; Docs. 45, 46.

the men-of-war would land 200 men more to attack and take possession of Anastasia Island. This appeared to the naval commanders as absolutely necessary for the reduction of St. Augustine, "as it will cut off all communication by sea, which will answer the end of the ships till the season of the year will admit of their returning on the service."¹⁴

On the 18th, Vander Dussen, having inspected carefully the area around Point Quartell, sent to Oglethorpe the resolution of the naval commanders. At the same time he informed the General that there was no other place as convenient as Point Quartell for covering the men and emplacing a battery to command the North River and keep the Spanish galliots in awe; that mortars could be placed at the Point under cover of some hills and within half gun-shot of the Castillo. If it should be necessary to prepare a battery for battering the town, it could be done, he wrote, without being exposed to the Spanish guns.

Next day Oglethorpe informed Vander Dussen by express that he had ordered the Scotch Highlanders, rangers and some Indians with a recently arrived company of the Carolina Regiment to march and retake possession of Fort Mose. He failed to disclose, however, that he had already agreed with Pearse to split his regiment, abandon the mainland, and land with 200 men on the deserted island of Anastasia. When Pearse informed Vander Dussen about the "secret" scheme, Oglethorpe and his men were already aboard two men-of-war.

Vander Dussen as well as the land officers were definitely against the plans of Oglethorpe and Pearse. To both commanders, the Colonel objected firmly, but his advise was not heeded. He argued, with prudent forethought, that by landing troops on Anastasia, the galliots would remain masters of the harbor and be able to cut off almost all communications between the troops of Point Quartell and the island. His plan, on the other hand, was to concentrate artillery and other implements of war at Point Quartell to battle the galliots and gain control of the harbor. After this was accomplished, the next step would be to secure the Matanzas and find a passage to the south of the town "without being hurt by the galleys, by which they would be harrassed on all sides without having it in their power to help themselves or hurt us." He also pointed out to Oglethorpe that by leaving the mainland with only some scattered forces, the Spaniards would be free on the land side of the castle to fetch cattle and other provisions, thus eliminating the possibility of forcing the surrender of the place by starvation.¹⁵

14. SCR, pp. 28-29; Docs. 47, 48.

15. SCR, pp. 29-31; Docs. 49, 51-53.

Oglethorpe, leaving Fort San Diego with part of his regiment as garrison and Fort Mose again occupied, marched down on the 20th to the nearest Palmetto Hut on the sea beach near St. Johns. Then he embarked on board the men-of-war anchored there and landed on Anastasia three days later with 400 Indians and regular troops, and 200 seamen under the command of Capts. Warren, Laws, and Townshend. "If we carry the island," wrote the General to Vander Dussen, "we shall have an easy communication with you and shall drive out the half galleys, and all our craft can come in and lie with safety within the bar."¹⁶

No opposition was encountered during the landing. The Spaniards had erected a sand battery opposite the north breakers, which commanded the landing place for some distance on both sides; they also had a lookout tower with small guns. Both places had been abandoned by the Spaniards when the South Carolina Regiment occupied Point Quartell. Upon the British landing, three of the Spanish galliots went down towards the bar and fired upon them. The galliots retired under the shelter of the Castillo when the sloops of the men-of-war made sail towards them.¹⁷

Two English maps of the siege show the area of Anastasia, the harbor, Point Quartell, the town, Matanzas River, and the position of the fleet at the time of landing.

According to them, Oglethorpe landed his troops within the bight of the east shore of the island, about five miles south of the old Spanish lighthouse or lookout tower. From the landing place the troops marched along the low ridge of the shore past the abandoned Spanish sand battery and established the tent camp at a point between the northern shore and the lighthouse. Two batteries are shown, one on the north trench facing Point Quartell, and the other near the marshes opposite the castle on the northwest of the island.

Pearse's fleet consisted of five three-masted ships--Squirrel, Flamborough, Hector, Tartar, Phoenix--and two two-masted brigantines--Woolf and Spence. In one of the maps, a three-masted ship is stationed off Matanzas bar to guard the inlet there, leaving six lying off the bar of St. Augustine, east of the breakers. Six smaller vessels, apparently sloops used as transports, were able to cross the bar and are shown as anchored in the channel, all along the northern end of the island, thus protecting the batteries from the rear and preventing any attack from the Spanish galliots. In one map, four of the galliots

16. SCR, pp. 32-33; Docs. 42, 59, 60.

17. SCR, p. 35; Doc. 59.

are represented as lying out of harm's way in the harbor, south of the castle.¹⁸

While Oglethorpe landed, Vander Dussen prepared a battery at Point Quartell of one mortar and two six-pounders on a point about one mile away from the castle. Lacking the bed of the mortar, it was emplaced on the sand. The carriages of the six-pounders proved so bad that they were forced to place the guns on the sands also.

During the time that the battery was being prepared, the galliots were busy firing at Oglethorpe's men on Anastasia. One day a party of Spanish Indians, who had landed the night before about a mile from the Point Quartell camp, fell upon some Cherokees and killed two of them. The Colonel marched three companies immediately, but upon their approach the Indians fled. He pursued them back through the bushes to the river (North) where they got on board their boat, "the galleys coming at the same time to support them."¹⁹

On June 24 began the bombardment that was to last until July 20. At eight o'clock (British time) in the morning of that day, Lieut. Col. William Cook fired the first bomb from the mortar of Point Quartell; its shell broke just over the castle. As the battery was placed opposite to the angle of one of the bastions, it was some time before the Spaniards could put any guns in position for firing at the mortar. At last, the English account says,

they threw a twenty-four pound shot. A shell was returned. The galleys advanced towards the point. The six pounders were fired at them; one of which shot falling across the hawse of the admiral galley, and the other in the middle of them, they retired under the castle. A reciprocal fire was kept up between the battery and the castle the whole forenoon, but with a great deal of trouble and difficulty, the mortar and guns burying themselves in the sands every time they were fired . . . All the night a reciprocal fire was kept up between the castle and the battery at Point Quartell.²⁰

18. Thos Silver, "A View of the Town and Castle of St. Augustine," June 20, 1740; "A Plan of the Harbor of St. Augustine. . .," 1740, SCR, p. 1.

19. SCR, p. 33.

20. SCR, p. 36; Docs. 63, 67.

On the same day, and from his command post in the castle, Montiano realized the gravity of his situation. The British men-of-war remained stationed off the bar, and on that of Matanzas, and their land forces were in possession of Anastasia and its watchtower, of all the beach of Point Quartell, and maintained camps at St. Johns, Fort Diego and Mose. But he still managed to send repeated urgent messages to the governor of Cuba, which were transmitted by runners along the coast, and thence by small vessels across to Habana. The ships blockading the harbor, he said, were seven frigates of 23 to 30 guns, two packets of 10 or 12 guns, three sloops, six schooners, and 12 scows exclusive of boats and launches belonging to the vessels.

A few splinters from the mortars fell into the castle, but most of the shells had passed over and beyond the lines of entrenchments. There was a great deal of confusion in the town since the only protection was the fort, with the land around it an open field. Families abandoned their houses and came to put themselves under the protection of the fortress. So many persons collected within the walls of a relatively small place soon gave rise to serious apprehensions on the part of the besieged, of being reduced by starvation to the necessity of a speedy surrender. The situation is pitiable, wrote the governor, but "nothing gives me anxiety but the want of provisions, and if Your Excellency for want of competent force, cannot send relief, we must all indubitably perish."²¹

In the morning of June 25, Vander Dussen went down to the battery, pointed the mortar and threw a shell right into the bastion of the castle closest to his position. Several guns were fired from the castle and the galliots at the men at Point Quartell and Anastasia.

Vander Dussen felt that he still needed 18-pounders to batter the town and castle and nine-pounders to neutralize the firing power of the galliots. He went over in a small canoe to confer with the General. He found him landing some 18-pounders to form an advanced battery on Anastasia to beat down the town and destroy the galliots. Two of the pieces were actually carried by sailors about a mile up to a place on a hard marsh, and one of them was mounted. Its location was about a mile and a half from the castle. Later in the day Oglethorpe and the Colonel found a better place upon the side of the north marsh opposite the castle, and about one mile from it. From the castle the Spaniards fired briskly at them.²²

At this point in our narration of the steps taken by the British to besiege the castle, a few words should be said about the range of

21. EFP, Doc. 202, June 24, 1740.

22. SCR, pp. 36-38; Docs. 66, 67, 69.

artillery and the nature of siege batteries in those days.

The following is a table of the mean ranges of siege artillery in yards:

16 and 24 pounders	1120 to 1340 yds.
8 and 12 "	900 to 1000 "
Howitzers of long range	900 to 1200 "
Mortars	670 to 1670 "

Transporting the heavy siege pieces and mounting them was a difficult task. About 40 hours of continuous work was required to establish a battery. These batteries had to be strong enough to resist the fire of the heavy fortress artillery and also capable of defense from an assault. Guns were mounted on heavy wooden platforms and fired through embrasures cut and firmly revetted with large gabions and saucissons. Mortars did not require embrasures as they were fired with elevated muzzles over the parapet. In the rear of the battery was its magazine. Batteries were surrounded by a wide and deep ditch where fraises and palisades were planted.

Firing from the batteries was not continuous. It was dangerous to fire more than 50 shots from one cannon in 24 hours on account of inferior metal. At least 10 minutes interval was allowed between each shot to prevent overheating. Rapid fire could cause the vent to blow out. After three hours of firing, the pieces were rested for one hour and "refreshed" by pouring water mixed with vinegar into the barrel.²³

23. Col. John W. Wright, "Notes on the siege of Yorktown in 1781 with special reference to the conduct of a siege in the eighteenth century," William and Mary College Quarterly Magazine, Vol. XII, No. 4 (October, 1932), pp. 235-36.

A Turning Point

1. Fort Mose's Flying Party

While Oglethorpe was preparing the first battery at Anastasia to batter the town and galliots, the desperate Spaniards struck a formidable blow at Fort Mose. Because this action was the turning point of the siege operations, we must attempt to trace the events that led to that bloody disaster.

An integral and obvious phase of the siege plans was to prevent the Spanish garrison and civilians from foraging off the countryside north of the town. There was an east-west distance of about 16 1/2 miles between St. Augustine and the St. Johns. Oglethorpe decided to cover this area with a flying party stationed at Mose that would strike Spaniards attempting to leave the castle by land. This type of operation called for mobility and woodcraft.

Thus, on June 20, after Point Quartell had been occupied, Oglethorpe ordered the following special troops to retake possession of Fort Mose:

- (1) Highland Rangers from Georgia, 10 men, under Captain MacKay, Jr. He held a commission in the Georgia provincial service and another in the British regular army.
- (2) English Rangers, eight horsemen made up of volunteer English settlers from Georgia, commanded by Lieut. Robert Scroggs.
- (3) Carolina Rangers, nine volunteers serving as horsemen, commanded by Capt. William Palmer, Jr., son of Col. Palmer.
- (4) Highland Independent Company, an infantry unit of 60 hardy Scotch settlers from Georgia, armed with broadswords and dressed in plaids. They were all volunteers under Capt. John MacKintosh.
- (5) Creeks and Uchees, about 40, serving under a half-breed officer, Capt. Jones. He was assisted by another officer, James Hewit, who controlled the Uchee faction.

All the above forces were provincial or native troops with a very short-time experience, and paid out of Oglethorpe's

own pocket. A red-coated squad of disciplined regular soldiers from the General's own 42nd Regiment of Foot--a sergeant and 12 men--was added to form a core around which the provincials could be bolstered during combat.

The entire party probably consisted of about 137 to 140 men, including some Indians who arrived the night before the battle and giving allowance to several of the Independent Company who were sick.¹

Unwittingly, Oglethorpe set the stage for the only defeat his troops would suffer in a man-to-man encounter with Spanish troops.

He gave the operational control of the whole party to Col. Palmer, but the actual command of the men was retained by Capt. MacKay. Palmer held only South Carolina militia rank, and under traditions of those days, could not command the regular troops and provincials. He was, however, one of the few officers in the expedition of Oglethorpe who had first-hand knowledge of the terrain. As he was given direction of the party, Palmer insisted that the number of men was too small, but accepted the command only after Oglethorpe threatened to offer the position to another officer. Oglethorpe assured him that he would send more men to join the Mose party.²

Relations between Georgians and Carolinians had been somewhat strained during the past several years due to the rivalry over the Creek and Cherokee Indian trade. This rivalry and animosity was brought to Florida by the soldiers of both colonies. From the initial days of the invasion, some bickering between the rival soldiers had been evident. The simple fact that Palmer was a militia officer and MacKay a regular was bound to bring a clash of personalities. Following the prevailing trait of regular officers of the army, MacKay looked down on Palmer as a militia officer. He refused to follow the Colonel's orders and advice without a show of defiance. Palmer, on the other hand, was accused of being rude, uncouth, and arrogant in dealing with other men.³

1. Hugh MacKay, Jr., A Letter from Lieut. Hugh MacKay . . . to John MacKay (London, 1742), pp. 22-23, 26-27; two of MacKays letters are dated August 10, 1740 and June 21, 1742; Larry E. Ivers, "The Battle of Fort Mose," The Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. LI, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 138-39. This is an excellent account of the Mose affair.

2. SCR, p. 32; Docs. 32, 36, 55; Ivers, op. cit., p. 140.

3. Ivers, op. cit., pp. 141-42.

Palmer and his party had no more provisions with them than what they carried in their knapsacks, about eight pounds of bread each, ordered by the General. Before departing, the Colonel repeated to Oglethorpe that he had too few men, and added: "Sir, you are going to sacrifice those men." Oglethorpe promised to send him more assistance as soon as Anastasia was occupied.⁴

The small party left Fort Diego on June 21 and marched south to a place called the "Grove". Here they camped the first night and next morning marched out and reached Mose about midday.⁵

Palmer received verbal instructions from Oglethorpe to alarm the Spaniards in St. Augustine as often as he could and to fire upon the town at night whenever a signal was made from the watchtower of Anastasia. According to Capt. Palmer, MacKay and MacKintosh received similar orders, but in writing. Carrying only light equipment to permit faster movement, the troops were to act as a flying party, ranging back and forth across the narrow strip of land between the St. Johns and the ocean. As a safety precaution, they were to spend no more than one night in the same location, but to hide and camp in the woods by night and move into the open during daytime to intercept Spanish foraging parties. They were to withdraw to Fort Diego if a superior force appeared.⁶

Paying no regards to Palmer's instructions, MacKay and MacKintosh moved immediately into the mouse-trap fort of Mose with the foot soldiers and began constructing temporary quarters of thatched palmetto. Palmer, who camped with the "rangers" outside the demolished fort, told MacKay and MacKintosh that Mose could prove to be a grave for them; that the General's directions were to camp by night in the woods and that "he had much rather encamp any where without in open ground where he could fight his enemy round about wherever he could find an advantage."⁷

It is evident that MacKay usurped Palmer's direction of the party by merely ignoring him and acting only on those orders he deemed necessary.

4. SCR, p. 32; Docs. 37, 64, 32.

5. MacKay, Letter, pp. 26, 27; Jones says the party reached Mose on June 20. SCR, Doc. 32.

6. SCR, Docs. 32, 36, 37, 55; MacKay, Letter, pp. 24, 27, 28, 32; MacKintosh to MacKintosh, May 1 and June 20, 1741, CRG, XXXV, p. 336; Depositions of MacKintosh, Macqueen, and Mackdonald, Ibid., pp. 430-31.

7. SCR, p. 33; Docs. 32, 36, 37.

Except for the nine Carolina rangers, the Mose party was composed of regulars, Georgians, and Indians, and most, if not all of these troops and officers, followed MacKay's example. This rift between Georgians and Carolinians eventually led to their destruction.

Vander Dussen, seeing from Point Quartell the English colors hoisted in Fort Mose, and wishing to make contact with the flying party, sent a man who swam the North River with a letter directed to the "Commanding Officer," which was received, opened and answered by MacKay.⁸

One of the many disagreements between Palmer and MacKay concerned the number and disposition of the guards. Palmer and MacKintosh desired to place sentries at musket shot distance--about 100 yards--from the fort, but MacKay thought that the Indians would only destroy them. Instead of a single sentry, he wanted an entire corporals guard placed out. Because of this argument, the guard plan was not completed and no adequate sentries were placed outside the fort.⁹

By June 23 the flying party had settled into a routine. At four o'clock each morning, following Palmer's orders, the long roll of the drums would sound to arms. Palmer had the rangers stand near the ditch with weapons ready. He had fought the Yamassee Indians enough to know their favorite time to attack. Then he walked into the fort to inspect the readiness of the troops camped inside. What he saw enraged him. Some of the men were sitting in their huts lazily pulling on clothing; most remained sleeping, wrapped in blankets and tartans. The Colonel blamed MacKay and MacKintosh by saying that "the Spaniards from the castle could count their number almost to a man and that they would have their throats cut." To this, they said: "There they had encamped and that they would not move, if the enemy came they must fight." There were heated arguments between the three men. MacKay and MacKintosh "seemed to carry equal command and to act alike in every thing and observed no directions that the colonel gave them." Palmer often fell into a passion with the two officers, telling them that "he valued his life no more than they did, but that they lied like dogs to have their throats cut." This scene was repeated in essentially the same manner during the next three mornings.¹⁰

8. SCR, p. 34; Docs. 32, 58; Evers, op. cit., p. 141.

9. Depositions of MacKintosh, Macqueen, and Macdonald, in CRG, XXXV, pp. 431, 432; MacKay, Letter, p. 28; Evers, op. cit., p. 142.

10. MacKay, Letter, p. 28, says that drums were sounded at three o'clock in the morning; SCR, Docs. 32, 36, 37; Evers, op. cit., pp. 143-44.

Later in the day Capt. Palmer with his men and the Georgia Rangers and Jones with the Indians made excursions, sometimes for 15 miles around, and rounded up Spanish horses. At night they used to go out and alarm the Spaniards in St. Augustine. Particularly the night of the 23rd, seeing the colors of Oglethorpe on Anastasia, Col. Palmer went out with the rangers and Indians, and Capt. MacKay with some of the Highlanders, and fired upon the town.

On the 24th Capt. MacKay sent a canoe with a letter to Col. Vander Dussen requesting beef and rice to supplement his troops' ration of bread which would be gone by next day. He also begged for a surgeon as several of the troops were sick with dysentery. Vander Dussen sent MacKay half a barrel of rice since he was also low on provisions.¹¹

Col. Palmer was extremely concerned about Oglethorpe's failure to support his party. The rations of bread issued for every man were sufficient only for about four or five days. Palmer began to talk about the disaster that was about to befall them. He was heard to say that the General "had sent him there for sacrifice." Oglethorpe had promised to send help from Anastasia but no word had been received. Their rations were running out.¹²

In the night of June 26, a ranger patrol was sent to burn a house close by the town, but it was so dark that the rangers were unable to find it. The patrol returned to Fort Mose between midnight and one o'clock. They reported to Col. Palmer they had heard the Indians inside the town dancing the war dance. This was no surprise to Palmer, who was a veteran Indian fighter. Suspecting that there would be "a Brush Before Day," he ordered everyone to lie down and take a nap, saying that he would awake them at three or four o'clock in the morning.¹³

2. A Blood Bath

After the initial bombardment of June 24 from Point Quartell, Montiano had perceived correctly that the besiegers were somewhat embarrassed and that their operations were beginning to relax. The bombardment of the castle and town had caused no loss of life or material damage, but the psychological impact was pronounced. There was a dreadful and real danger that the besieged town would run out of provisions. No doubt the Spaniards needed a victory, no matter

11. SCR, Docs. 64, 65.

12. SCR, Doc. 37.

13. SCR, Doc. 37.

how small, to boost sagging morale. This became possible when Montiano was positively informed by spies that Mose was only occupied by a detachment of a little over 100 men.

On Saturday, June 25, a body of troops composed of 200 infantry and cavalry men, 60 convicts, 20 Indians, and 20 free Negroes were assembled and briefed by Montiano. Captain Antonio Salgado, a veteran of 34 years of service, was selected as commander and instructed to conduct a pre-dawn assault on Mose. Two other officers assisted Salgado, Capts. Felix de Visa Díaz and Alonso Izquierdo. Salgado was officer of one of the **eight companies** of reinforcements sent from Habana in 1738.¹⁴

About 12 o'clock that night the Spanish raiding force quietly moved out of the castle and marched "cautiously and noislesly" toward the sleeping camp of Mose. The British ranger patrol and the Spanish raiders must have missed making contact by only a few minutes. Salgado's force reached the vicinity of Mose about two o'clock where they remained in ambush. A reconnaissance party was sent forward to ascertain the positions of the British, while the cavalry moved in a circle around the fort to cut off the road or retreat to Fort Diego.

As he had done during the previous nights, Col. Palmer had the drums beat "to arms" about three or four o'clock in the morning of June 26. Almost all the rangers left the comfort of their blankets and dressed on Palmer's command. Then he went to the fort, roused the men up, and "argued the danger they were in and advised them to stand to their arms." But as usual, not regarding his orders, most of them crawled back into their bedrolls.¹⁵

Salgado's men were divided into three or four parties and seem to have attacked from as many directions. They were able to approach unseen to within almost 100 yards of the fort.

Col. Palmer and Jones were standing talking in the gateway when suddenly one of the advanced sentinels called out that there was a party of men coming. Col. Palmer immediately called out for everyone to stand to their arms and not to fire until the Spaniards fired first. Then, he said, "half of you fire and fall back, making room for the rest to come up, and we will kill them like dogs." No sooner had he spoken than some of the Highlanders stationed on guard in one of the bastions opened fire. The Spaniards began pouring volleys into the

14. EFP, Doc. 203, August 9/40; SC AG1 86-5-25/7, Montiano to the crown, August 12, 1740; Fr. Francisco de Buenaventura to Joseph Ortigoza (c. 1742).

15. EFP, Doc. 203; SCR, Docs. 32. 36.

fort. Cursing the men who had disobeyed his orders, Palmer and the rangers moved into the ditch of the fort.¹⁶

Capt. Jones ran into the fort to assemble his Indians and moved them to one of the bastions. He found the entire party in a state of great hurry and confusion, with yelling officers and sergeants trying vainly to gather their men at their appointed stations. Some of the men were dressed and others undressed. Jones went into every bastion three times and could not find Capt. MacKintosh nor see any of his soldiers.

Capt. MacKay must have been awakened by the commotion. He was dressed only in a shirt, a pair of linen drawers, stockings, and carrying a small sword and musket. MacKay ordered Cornet Bailie, the officer of the guard, to defend the entrance gate with his 18-man guard, but in a short time the Spaniards began to push them from the gate. Then MacKay ordered his cousin, Ensign Charles MacKay, of the Highland Company, to support the guard with 12 men.¹⁷

Outside the ditch of the fort, Col. Palmer and the rangers were holding their own. Captain Palmer, upon hearing the first shots, had grabbed his brother and one Charles Graves and moved to the ditch about 12 yards away, where he joined his father and other rangers who were trying to prevent the Spaniards from forcing the gate. At one time, attacking in different parties, the Spaniards rushed on and particularly endeavored to force their way into the fort through the gate. But it was well defended for a quarter of an hour by the constant fire from the two front bastions and by Col. Palmer from the ditch.

The defenders of the fort were able to repulse the first two charges, but a considerable body of Spaniards finally forced their way in, "shord in hand," by sheer weight of numbers. At the same time other parties entered through the two wall breaches, "so that the fort was at once full of Spaniards, it being then about half an hour before day."

Hell broke loose in the hand-to-hand melee, with the Spaniards from all directions clubbing, cutting and slashing as fast as they could. The Highland company was decimated and the squad of regulars were all dead, wounded, or captured. Almost half the Highland rangers had been killed or taken prisoners; the majority of the Indian were dead. Others, as soon as the Spaniards were becoming masters of the fort, jumped over on all sides of the walls into the ditch and made the best of their way off through the raiders that surrounded the place.

16. SCR, Docs. 32, 36, 37.

17. SCR, Doc. 32; MacKay, Letter, p. 30; Evers, p. 147.

All this time, Col. Palmer maintained the ditch where he was stationed, with only two Carolina rangers by his side. At last he was shot by one Spaniard from the fort. Although bleeding very much at the mouth, he loaded his gun, and died. Being left alone, the two rangers escaped to the river side opposite to Point Quartell, about a mile and a half from Mose.¹⁸

One of the first to escape the butchery was Capt. MacKay. He jumped undressed over into the ditch below with a small sword in his hand, and advised the men inside the fort to shift for themselves. He took along William MacKintosh, the fourteen-year-old son of Capt. MacKintosh, whose fate was unknown.¹⁹

Jones escaped with six Indians and met Captain Palmer and his brother near the ditch. They forced their way through the Spaniards under cover of thick clouds of smoke. At one point a Yamasse Indian, who was about to knock down Jones, was shot by Capt. Palmer. Jones and Palmer broke through and ran to nearby Mose Creek. They waded down the creek to its junction with the North River, opposite Point Quartell. Here they found Capt. MacKay, Lieut. Scroggs, and others who had been able to escape. Scroggs wore only a shirt and was armed with a pistol. MacKay had on only his shirt, a pair of linen drawers and a pair of stockings. He had a small sword in his hand, a small scar across two fingers, and "a small prick in his breech and the top of his yard." MacKay said that he had been wounded while defending the gate, but the Carolina officers believed the wounds were caused by the prickly palmetto royal that surrounded the ditch of Fort Mose.²⁰

If the Spaniards had pursued their victory, they would have caught the survivors and added them to the long list of casualties. But two boats brought them on time across the North River to Point Quartell. Perceiving the rescue operation of the boats, the galliots moved up the river to intercept their landing. After some shot was fired at them, both from Point Quartell and Anastasia, the galliots retired under the castle, and the remnant of the Mose party landed safely at Point Quartell.

Col. Vander Dussen sent an express immediately to Fort San Diego to acquaint the garrison of that place with what had occurred at Mose, "that they might be upon their guard lest the Spaniards should surprise them." He also sent an account of the affair over to Oglethorpe at Anastasia. In the afternoon the Colonel moved his camp up to the

18. SCR, Docs. 32, 36, 37; MacKay, Letter, p. 32.

19. SCR, Doc. 37; MacKay, Letter, pp. 32, 33.

20. SCR, Docs. 32, 36; MacKay, Letter, p. 33.

nearest point close by the battery, "judging it more proper in case the Spaniards should think fit to make him a visit."²¹

At Fort Mose the Spaniards surveyed their victory in the early morning sunlight. Capt. MacKintosh, Cornet Bailie, Quartermaster James Macqueen, and many others, besides Indians, were prisoners. With the prisoners stripped and their hands bound behind their backs, the Spaniards marched back to the castle in great triumph, shouting and firing and carrying the British colors taken in the fort. It was said, by two British sources, that the Spaniards cut off the heads and genitals of some slain and carried them to St. Augustine.²²

British estimations of their own casualties range from 50 to 78 men killed and 20 to 28 prisoners, and the Spanish losses at between 75 and 300. Montiano admitted the death of 11 men, including Ensign José de Aguilera; he claimed 75 British dead and 35 prisoners.²³

After the raid of Mose was completed, Montiano ordered the fort to be demolished and "the dead" buried. From the prisoners he acquired some news. Three or four of them agreed in saying that both by rumor and by gazette, they had learned of the preparation in England of a considerable expedition against Habana consisting of 30 ships of the line and a landing party of 10,000 men.

Of the armament besieging St. Augustine, the prisoners said it was composed of seven frigates, one of 50 guns from Bermuda, another of 40, another of 27, and the rest of 20; the number of despatch boats, bilanders, or of other small boats they did not know. They varied in their estimates of the main body of troops, some putting it at 1,500, 1,200 and as low as 900.²⁴

For Lieut. Governor Bull the destruction of the Mose party was a hard pill to swallow, as he expressed to Oglethorpe by letter of July 9:

21. SCR, pp. 40-41; Docs. 32, 37.

22. SCR, Docs. 32, 37; MacKintosh to MacKintosh, May 1, 1741, in CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 180; Deposition of Kenneth Bailie, March 11, 1742, Ibid., Vol. V, 605.

23. SCR, Docs. 32, 37, 127; MacKintosh to MacKintosh, May 1 and June 22, 1741, in CRG, Vol. XXXV, pp. 180, 183; EFP, July 6, 1740, Doc. 203; AGI-SD, 58-1-32, Montiano, August 9, 1740.

24. EFP, Doc. 203, July 6, 1740.

Your Letter of the 16th Instant I received by the Hands of Capt. William Palmer, who has informed me that he was present in the Engagement when his Father and about seventy-eight Men more were killed by the Spaniards in the Attack they made against that small Party of our Forces, consisting of one hundred and forty Men, about one Mile Distance from the Castle, whom you say being left to alarm the Spaniards on the Land Side, were surprized by them.

It is a Matter of great Concern to me to hear that the Enemy had so great an Advantage of those brave Men, and to make such Havock among them without the lest Fear of their being relieved or supported by any assistance, as one Regiment was safe with you on the Island and the other on the Point opposite to it, without the Craft hired by this Government for their Use and Service, and the Spaniards at full Liberty to go any where but on the Island and Point where the two Regiments are posted.

The Concern I have for the Welfare of Carolina and the Wellwishers who so chearfully venture their Lives in this Expedition makes me hope and desire to hear something more to the Benefit and Satisfaction of the good People of this Province, who have so readily assisted in this Undertaking."²⁵

Oglethorpe thought that the Mose affair occurred because his orders were not obeyed. Most probably, he was correct.²⁶

25. SCR, Doc. 127.

26. SCR, Doc. 129, Oglethorpe to Bull, July 30.

The Troublesome Galliot

1. Anastasia Operations

Fort Mose's fiasco was "one unfortunate action," as Oglethorpe called it. While it demoralized the British forces, the mood of the Spaniards was enlivened. By one single stroke, they destroyed an elite force of regulars and provincials while Vander Dussen's and Oglethorpe's regiments were not able or neglected to assist them. It certainly was a turning point in the siege and blockade. Mose's victory was the key that opened the countryside to the Spaniards and enabled them to provision somewhat the already strained garrison and populace, especially of beef. It also gave freedom to the people to move from the congested castle into the country, and rendered the bombardment of the town and castle from Anastasia "of little service" or purpose.¹

After the action at Fort Mose, the tempo of activities slowed down in the British camps, especially at Anastasia. With the countryside opened to the besieged and the men-of-war determined to lift the blockade, Oglethorpe realized that he could not besiege the town by land and water unless more men and naval assistance were received. The success of the siege hinged on the destruction of the galliots.²

It was not until the morning of June 27 that Vander Dussen was able to fix the Point Quartell mortar upon a wooden bed that had been brought over from Anastasia. Several shells were thrown into the town and castle, but the Spaniards fired but three or four guns. Although some shot had been fired from Anastasia when the Mose survivors were being rescued, the batteries of the island were still unfinished.

Vander Dussen and Lieut. Col. Cook visited the island and found matters in a great deal of confusion and derangement. "Resolutions taken and not put in execution, and the [advanced] battery in no sort of forwardness." One gun had been carried down, but another one was lying in the mud. The seamen were complaining and saying that they would not do any more work. Capt. Warren was very uneasy and complained that Oglethorpe had landed on the island without provisions, ammunition

1. SCR, Doc. 98.

2. SCR, p. 41; Doc. 70.

or anything else but what the seamen had brought. He threatened to go on board with all his men if the situation was not changed. The Col. tried to smooth out the relations between the Capt. and the General. He begged the Captain to do everything possible to finish the installation of the battery in order to keep the galliots in awe. If the galliots were not destroyed by the battery, he offered to go himself in the night time and destroy them, provided the men-of-war would lend him their boats. This was agreed to and Capt. Warren offered to join him.

But to Vander Dussen's consternation, Oglethorpe had adopted other plans without consulting him. As a result of a conference he held with the Commodore and officers of the men-of-war, the Colonel was ordered to move his regiment and all his craft to Anastasia, and leave at Point Quartell a guard detachment for the defense of the battery.³

The Colonel and Lieut. Col. Cook returned to the camp at Point Quartell on the 27th and at night fired several shells. Some shots were also exchanged between the advanced battery on Anastasia and, the Castillo and the galliots.

Next day, fearing that if Oglethorpe's orders were followed the guard detachment that was to be left at Point Quartell might suffer the same fate of the party at Mose, Vander Dussen summoned all his officers together and requested their opinions about the General's orders. Accordingly, the officers prepared a statement in writing to the effect that for the welfare of the regiment and the success of the expedition, the whole South Carolina Regiment ought to go over to the island or stay together at Point Quartell. They pointed out that to divide the regiment and leave a party at Point Quartell was an invitation to another Mose disaster; that in case an attack should be made on the party proposed to be left at the Point, its battery could not prevent the galliots from landing a number of men because there was only one gun mounted on the sand; there were now a great number of sick and wounded and it would be too cruel and quite inhuman to leave them behind; if the mortar **and guns of the** Point were captured by the Spaniards, they certainly would use them against the men on Anastasia; and finally, that if St. Augustine was to be attacked on the Matanzas side, "we can not conceive of what loss the defending this Point can possibly be, especially when we consider that it may require the whole force to attempt them on the other [land] side."⁴

3. SCR, pp. 41-42; Docs. 71, 72.

4. SCR, Doc. 73.

Vander Dussen went over to Anastasia and communicated the objections of the Carolina officers to Oglethorpe, who immediately said: "Then they refuse to obey orders," to which the Colonel answered: "No, Sir, this is only their opinion, but if your Excellency still orders me to do it, I will bring them over." Upon this, the matter was dropped.⁵

To the Colonel's surprise, he found the emplacing of the batteries at a stand as before, with little or no progress done. Captain Warren told the General that he would not take one step forward without an order from the Commodore, or having him "upon the spot." After this, Vander Dussen took the Commodore's barge, went off to the flagship and persuaded Pearce to come ashore with him and settle matters between Oglethorpe and the Captain. At their landing they went to Capt. Warren's tent, where the General joined them together with Capt. Laws.

Thus by **chance, a hasty general council of war was held between** the land and naval leaders of the expedition. Oglethorpe asked Pearce what should be done in the existing situation of affairs, since the naval officers had declared that they could not stay longer than July 16, "nor so long in case the easterly winds set in sooner." Pearce answered that it was the General's business to make that decision, but that **during** his remaining days off the St. Augustine bar, he would give all the assistance he could spare out of the ships. Then Oglethorpe asked the Colonel the same question, and for an answer he proposed the following plan of action:

- (1) the advanced battery of Anastasia should be raised as soon as possible in order to destroy the galliots, or at least to drive them under the castle; the mortars would be placed by Lieut. Col. Cook in a proper location where they should do the greatest damage; that if **any** of the galliots should escape, they should be attacked by the boats of the men-of-war as he had proposed before with Capt. Warren.
- (2) one half of the land forces and all the Indians be sent over to Fort Mose to cut off the Spaniards from access to the countryside; at Mose the troops would have a communication with the rest of the forces and be properly supplied with provisions and other necessities; that it was of utmost importance to move the Indians to the main-

5. SCR, p. 43; Doc. 25.

land because they were threatening to abandon the field. They had the insolence of telling the General that he was afraid of the Spaniards and for that reason he was camped at Anastasia.

- (3) that after all this was put in execution, and upon an agreed signal, the forces at Anastasia would be carried over to attack the southern end of the town while at the same time the forces on the mainland would attack the castle on the land side, "sword in hand."

Vander Dussen's plan was agreed to. Oglethorpe would go over to the mainland with his regiment and the Indians and the Colonel to Anastasia and take the command there.⁶

On June 29 the companies of the South Carolina Regiment began to move from Point Quartell to Anastasia. Next day in the evening a great mortar brought from Carolina was fired from the north point or lower battery of Anastasia, and also the mortar of Point Quartell. At night a great number of **coehorns were fired from the advanced battery**; some of the shells broke over the galliots and some fell short.

In the morning of July 1, two deserters from the galliots--an Englishman and a Dutchman--came to the camp of Anastasia. They reported that the Spaniards, thinking that there were only 200 men on Anastasia and 200 at Point Quartell, intended the night before to land 500 men on Anastasia, but that the galliots retired under the Castillo when **the coehorns were fired; that the people of St. Augustine were very** much discouraged, but the victory of Mose had "plucked up some heart"; that among the prisoners taken at Mose was Capt. MacKintosh, who was reported to have been killed, and that one of the Indians prisoners was to be burned alive.⁷

In the afternoon, an English officer with a flag of truce and drum went down to the river side opposite the castle and beat a parley; a Spanish boat came across with a similar flag and received three letters written by Oglethorpe. These letters were answered by Montiano the following day.

6. SCR, p. 43-44; Docs. 74, 75.

7. SCR, p. 45; Docs. 76, 77.

In one letter Oglethorpe and Pearse demanded the surrender of the castle and everything that the Spaniards had in Florida, in order to prevent the effusion of blood that would result if the English were compelled to take the castle by the force of arms. Montiano's answer, signed also by the bishop, said they were more than ready and determined to shed blood in the defense of the castle and presidio of St. Augustine in order to always preserve in them the dominion of the Spanish King. By information of deserters afterwards, above two thirds of the people were in favor of **surrendering on** condition that they should be permitted to go to Habana. But the governor and the bishop, knowing that the men-of-war had designs to sail away soon, refused to surrender the castle.

The other two letters dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war. Among those captured at Mose was an Indian named Nicolhausa, whom the Spaniards delivered over to their Indian allies the Yamasees to be tortured and burned alive. One of the letters sent to Montiano was a message from the chief of the Cherokees, Cesar Augusto, acquainting the governor that if he permitted Nicolhausa to be burned, a Spanish horseman who had been taken would suffer the same fate. In the last letter, Oglethorpe requested the governor to prohibit the barbarous customs of the Indians, adding that otherwise he would be forced to resort to retaliation. Montiano consequently ordered Nicolhausa to be spared, and it was agreed upon both sides that in the future all Indian captives should be treated as prisoners of war.⁸

Oglethorpe did everything in his power to curb the natural barbarity of his own Indian allies. Shortly after the letters were delivered to Montiano, some of the Chickesaw Indians swam across the river and killed a Spanish Indian near the town. They came back dancing and singing the "Death Whoop"--according to their custom--to the General's tent to present him with the grizzly trophy of the Spanish Indian head. The General refused to accept it and spurned them with abhorrence, calling them barbarous dogs. Then the Indians went away very much disgusted, saying that if they had carried the head of an Englishman to the French, they would have been treated very differently. Squirrel, the King of the Chickesaw, told the General that "if he had carried one of our heads to the governor of St. Augustine he should have been used by him like a man, as he had been now used by the General like a dog."

It seems that the above Indians, as well as some of the others who were at Anastasia, had before requested the General to permit

8. EFP, Doc. 203, July 6, 1740; SC 58-1-32, Film No. 7; Harris, op. cit., pp. 236-37; SCR, Docs. 25, 28, 81.

them to cross the river and burn the town, but he refused saying that the houses would be useful to the British.⁹

No guns were fired on either side the day the three letters were delivered to Montiano. Meantime, some progress was made on the Anastasia batteries. In the evening of the same day Capt. Wright with the Volunteers and Negroes moved to Anastasia and worked all night on the advanced battery. The Volunteers in general had a great desire to have the opportunity of coming to action, but they and many others were dissatisfied because everything on Anastasia was carried on in a very dilatory manner.¹⁰

On July 2 the firing was renewed on both sides, and several shells were thrown as well as cannon fired from the advanced battery. Pearse came ashore, and with Captains Warren, Laws and Townshend, went to Vander Dussen's tent; Lieut. Cook joined them also. These officers talked about what was to be done concerning the plan proposed by Vander Dussen to attack the galliots and the town, on the south and north, at the same time. They all agreed that the General was retarding the execution of the plan by his **staying** on the island and not having landed the rest of the artillery for the batteries; that time was running short and Oglethorpe should have been already on the mainland.¹¹

Finally, by the 3rd, the Volunteers and their Negroes raised the advanced battery with a breastwork of sand bags, and four 18-pounders mounted and two mortars on a platform. This battery began to fire early at the Castillo and the galliots lying before the town returned the fire briskly. However, the galliots were soon forced to move further down. At noon the firing ceased; and another breastwork was thrown up to cover an exposed end of the battery where a sailor's legs had been shot off. A 9-pounder was mounted also to annoy the galliots. At three o'clock the fire was renewed actively on both sides and lasted till evening.

By July 5, the Carolina Regiment had completed the move to Anastasia while Oglethorpe's men were now at Point Quartell. Many shells were thrown and guns fired on both sides this day. The General was **not** inclined to attack the Castillo upon the land side without more troops. He acknowledged that the Spaniards were resolved to make a strong defense and that the galliots were the most troublesome thing they had met with.¹²

9. SCR, p. 47; Docs. 28, 36, 37, 42.

10. SCR, Docs. 28, 42, 81.

11. SCR, p. 46; Doc. 81.

12. SCR, pp. 47-48; Docs. 28, 42, 82, 83.

Next day in the morning, the battery on Anastasia began to play upon the Castillo again. A reciprocal fire was kept up till noon, and in the evening it began again. From the beginning of the bombardment up to this day, the British had thrown 122 large shells and 31 small ones, from which no corporal injury was received. An exact count of the shells was kept by the Spaniards by the ringing of a bell everytime one was fired. Two of the mortars fired shells of half a quintal.

From a deserter that had arrived some time before, Montiano learned that the General had brought 900 men, 300 of his regiment or regulars, and 600 Carolina militia; that it was unknown if other troops would come from Virginia or other parts; that the Carolina militia came supplied for four months. But the prisoners of Mose said that Oglethorpe would subdue St. Augustine even if it was necessary for him to stay one year in Florida.¹³

On the same day, Col. Vander Dussen proposed to the officers of the men-of-war on shore--Capts. Warren, Laws and Townshend--an attack upon the galliots if the officers would lend him some boats and men. He proposed to use two boats of 10 oars, one of 14, two of eight, and three of six, besides several canoes of a smaller size with 100 men under proper commanding officers. He argued that the night before he had gone along the river side and saw the situation of the galliots, and was therefore certain that the attack must be attended with success.

After reconciling all the objections of the naval officers, all agreed, including the Commadore, that the attack should be put in execution. But more difficulties arose and Pearse finally rejected the plan as being "too hazardous to undertake," according to the resolutions of a naval council of war. He further argued that because the galliots were under the protection of the cannon and musketry of the castle and town, it made the success so doubtful "as requires the most mature consideration before it is put in execution." Pearse objections were communicated to Oglethorpe.¹⁴

2. Lack of Naval Support

In the evening of July 7, Oglethorpe passed over in boats from Point Quartell to the mainland and made a signal for the forces on Anastasia to know it. Apparently, he was unaware of the indecisions of the naval officers in connection with the contemplated land and sea attack. Earlier in the afternoon Pearse had made a crucial signal

13. SCR, p. 48; Doc. 25; EFP, Doc. 203, July 6/40.

14. SCR, pp. 48-50; Docs. 84-88.

for Capt. Charles Fanshaw to abandon the blockade of the Matanzas inlet, and to join the rest of the men-of-war.

On the night of the same day, Montiano received a courier from the bar of Mosquito, about 60 miles south of St. Augustine, advising him of the arrival at that place the preceeding day of three large sloops, a small one, and two schooners with provisions from the governor of Habana--such as cassava, corn, rice--and 700 loads of flour sent by the Viceroy of New Spain and the governor and royal officers of Vera Cruz. When the vessels arrived off the bar of Mosquito, one of the sloops was seen and chased by an English ship and packet, and in this manner the English received notice of the arrival of provisions to relieve the city and Castillo of St. Augustine. This information was also passed on rapidly to the British camp by two Spanish deserters.

No doubt the English ship was that of Captain Fanshaw who was blockading the inlet of Matanzas. He later informed that before leaving the inlet he had seen a large sloop, two schooners and some launches lying off the bar of Mosquito. Perhaps the appearance of the Spanish relief vessels was one factor that prompted Pearse to abandon the blockade of the Matanzas inlet; the winds were also becoming easterly.

The same night that Montiano received news about the arrival of the relief vessels, a deserter came from the British camp and informed that on some night when the tide was high, Oglethorpe intended to make an attack on the town by sea and land. After receiving this information, the governor suspended the execution of the plan he had fixed on for bringing the provisions, "little by little," and applied himself entirely to the purpose of resisting whatever attempts the "pride and anogance" of Oglethorpe might undertake.¹⁵

On July 8 Vander Dussen went on board to see the Commodore. A meeting was held with all seven captains of the men-of-war to discuss Pearse's refusai to go along with the plan of attacking the galliots. With the wind setting in easterly, the captains told the Colonel that they "should be obliged to slip their cables and [could] give him no further assistance."

By letter of the same day, the Colonel explained to Pearse the consequences that might result from his decision to sail away from the bar of St. Augustine:

15. EFP, Doc. 205, July 28; AGI-SD 58-1-32, Montiano to the King, Aug. 9/40 (SC); SCR, p. 51.

You are now to consider the Scituation we shall be left in when the Time comes that you are to go. I shall be left upon a large Island where the Enemy can land upon us from all Parts, if those Galleys are left in their Possession, and they may cut off all Communication betwixt me and the General. If a north-east Wind blows all our Craft must go ashore, and is liable to be attacked by them, my Force not being sufficient to defend both Ends of the Island. If I send my Craft round to the Metansas, which is the only and best Place, I must follow with all my Forces in order to defend myself and them; and so leave this Side open to the Enemy, and the Bar to any Embarkations either to go in or out, and it is impossible for me to transport the Artillery, which must fall a Prey to the Enemy. But must leave this also to your Consideration. You are too well acquainted with the fatal Consequences that must follow from our being defeated upon the Province of South Carolina, and therefore needless for me to repeat.

As an alternative, he proposed to the Commodore the following plan:

I shall only give my Opinion in Duty to my Country and those under my Command, who must be left behind. If the Galleys are not to be attacked, as supposed impracticable by your last Resolutions, I should think that the only Way left at present (and you will be a Judge whether it may be put in Execution) is that one, or both, of his Majesty's Sloops might be lightened and go in over the Bar of Metansas, which will secure that Side, and I think myself strong enough to defend this. The General with his Forces upon their Back will keep them in a close Blockade, and must soon reduce them to surrender. But suppose they should hold out longer than might reasonably be expected, yet we shall hinder all Communication, and may send to Carolina for a greater Supply of Men and other Necessaries or from any of the neighbouring Colonies.¹⁶

16. SCR, pp. 50-52; Docs. 91, 92.

Vander Dussen's proposition was considered by a naval council, and it resolved that two men-of-war sloops well manned and armed would go over to secure the Matanzas inlet ("if possible") for the protection of the forces left on Anastasia, but "this is all the assistance can be given from his Majesty's Ships."

When the easterly winds increased, the men-of-war slipped their cables and stood out to sea. All night the wind blew very hard from the northeast and the rough waters of the harbor drove up several boats ashore upon the island, a good way above high-water mark.¹⁷

Sometime during the same day--July 8--Oglethorpe went over to Fort Mose with his regiment and the Chicasaw Indians, where he saw several graves and found 30 dead men whom he buried with military honors. Next day, after advancing some distance towards St. Augustine and pitching his camp in the middle of a marsh on the west side of the North River, the General sent his aide de camp (Col. Barnwell) to Anastasia to ask Vander Dussen why the galliots had not been attacked as agreed on. By letter, the Colonel acquainted the General with everything that had occurred between him and the naval captains, and added, hopefully:

They (the Men of War) are now out at Sea. I am in great hopes if they should stay out a few Days, to make an Attempt upon the Galleys with the Assistance of their Men which they have left ashore. Mr. Swanton, who was left to command them, seems not to want Fire, and hope therefore to make the Thing do with him before the Return of the Ships. And for that Purpose desire you will send my Boat as soon as possible, that being the principal Boat for that Affair, theirs being all gone. If I succeed in bringing them into it, I shall acquaint your Excellency what Time it is to be put into Execution, . . .

But when the Colonel proposed his scheme to Lieut. Swanton, the latter informed Vander Dussen that he had orders not to venture any of the seamen until "the return of the [Commodore] ships."¹⁸

The South Carolina Colonel must have been a man of extraordinary patience. He still had strong hopes in the success of the expedition. On July 10 he went to the southern parts of Anastasia and found there a plantation with corn, water melons, and a house where it seemed the

17. SCR, p. 52; Doc. 93, 25.

18. SCR, p. 52-53; Docs. 55, 94, 95.

Spaniards from the galliots kept watch at night. The house was on a fine bluff opposite the mouth of St. Sebastian River which ran up to the rear of the town. In the afternoon Vander Dussen took Lieut. Col. Cook to the bluff and told him that he thought it was an excellent place for a battery to keep the galliots or any other vessel from going in and out and hindering the galliots from going up the St. Sebastian. Both men agreed to make the battery as soon as possible in case the sloops of the men-of-war were not sent to secure the inlet of Matanzas.¹⁹

Capt. Wright of the Volunteers informed Vander Dussen of his intentions to go back to South Carolina. He saw no "prospect of anything being attempted" to take the town and castle. Besides, he and many of his company were suffering from fluxes and disorders caused by the poor quality of water on Anastasia. He then embarked for Carolina on July 12 with all the members of his company, except five or six who chose to stay with the regiment. This produced a great uneasiness in the minds of those who stayed on the island.²⁰

Next day all the men-of-war returned off the bar, except Sir Yelverton Payton in the Hector who sailed back to his station in Virginia, but left a boat and crew of hands ashore. Pearse sent the Phoenix and Wolf sloops with the pilots to sound the bar of Matanzas. At their return a council-of-war was held and they declared that there was not enough water upon the bar for the sloops to go in; that even if they sailed in, they could not lie safe from hurricanes nor could fight more than one abreast in case they were attacked by the galliots. But Lieut. Blompfield Baradal, of the Wolf sloop, who had gone along with the pilots, disagreed with them. He declared that there was not only enough water in the bar for the sloops to go in, but that they could lie quite safely when they were inside; that there was enough room in the inlet for three sloops to fight abreast in case they should be attacked. However, the Commodore informed Vander Dussen and Oglethorpe that the last council of war, based on the opinion of the pilots, had determined that the sending of two sloops over the bar of Matanzas was "impracticable to be put in execution. The 5th [16th] July is near at hand. I shall therefore be obliged in a day or two to embark the seamen . . . "21

Still hopeful, Vander Dussen proposed to Oglethorpe the alternative of building the battery on the Matanzas opposite to the mouth of San Sebastian River. This battery would keep the galliots from

19. SCR, p. 53; Doc. 96.

20. SCR, pp. 54-55.

21. SCR, pp. 55-56; Docs. 25, 101, 102,

moving any further to the southward, and the battery at Point Quartell would keep them from going towards the bar. Since his plan required to keep possession of Anastasia and the mainland, he therefore desired to apply to the Commodore for the 200 men from the fleet who were on Anastasia, "to be left ashore with proper officers to command them; and they would maintain one of the batteries, till the hurricane months be over and the fleet return to our assistance."

If nothing could be done to secure Anastasia with the 200 seamen, wrote the General to Pearse, the only choice left was to discontinue the siege.

By this Day's Return, upwards of fifty Men are sick and unfit for Service of my Regiment, and others do not fare better. It is impossible without Assistance to carry off the Artillery. If that were once safe, I would with the Land Forces and Indians keep the Main and the Town blockaded till I hear what Supplies might probably come. But Sickness amongst us, Succours thrown into the Place by the Information you sent me from Capt. Fanshaw, and besides the Half Gallies makes me think it necessary to lay before you what they may do if they should follow and fall upon St. Andrew's, Frederica and all the Sea Settlements of Carolina, whilst the Garrison of Georgia and the Strength of Carolina are engaged here.

I desire therefore that you will think of protecting St. John's River, or at least **Frederica** where Ships may come into Jekyll Sound, and take such other Measures as may be proper to preserve the Artillery and the Sea Coast.²²

Meanwhile Montiano had been supplying the castle with provisions from the relief vessels stationed near the bar of **Mosquitos**. Noting that the contemplated British attack by land and water was not coming, the governor waited some time and then sent Ensign Antonio Nieto de Carvajal (probably on July 13) with two launches, a boat and a pirogue to carry on the work of unloading and transporting the provisions to the town. On reaching the Matanzas bar, as he was going to Mosquito, Nieto de Carvajal met with four boats and launches, one frigate and a dispatch boat which immediately opened fire. The Spaniards defended themselves stoutly from four o'clock in the afternoon until nightfall,

22. SCR, pp. 56-57; Docs. 103, 104.

suffering only the loss of the pirogue which splintered itself against the launches. The Spanish crew resumed their journey and returned to St. Augustine with about 200 loads (1030 bushels) of flour. They continued making trips back and forth successfully until the siege had been raised.²³

One day Vander Dussen tried to intercept one of the above trips. Having received information that one of the Spanish launches was coming through the Matanzas, and the rest following, he marched with the Company of Grenadiers to the "narrows" between Anastasia and the main. At daybreak of the next morning (July 14) he discovered three launches and a sloop with a flag at the foremast lying just by where he was on the narrows. He marched toward them, but the galliots came directly to protect the launches and the sloop, and forced him to retire "having no guns to support us."²³

23. One load was the equivalent of 5.15 bushels.

23a. EFP, Doc. 205, July 28, 1740; Montiano letter of August 9, 1740, op. cit., SCR, Doc. 105. One load was the equivalent of 5.15 bushels.

End of Blockade and Siege

1. British Retreat

On July 14, Pearse informed Oglethorpe that agreeable to a council of war held on board the Flamborough, he would **embark** the seamen and sail away next day; that he would order one of the men-of-war into Jekyll Sound, as the General had requested.

Vander Dussen's idea of leaving 200 seamen on shore to man one of the batteries of Anastasia was rejected, according to Pearse, for the following reasons:

- (1) The crews of the men-of-war were reduced so much by the number of sick on board, and weakness of the rest caused by the rainy weather, that if he should spare the 200 men, the remainder of the seamen would not be able to sail the ships.
- (2) Each ship's provisions were reduced so low, that it was impossible to leave a sufficient quantity of provisions for the seamen until the return of the ships.
- (3) There were **not** sufficient garments on board the fleet to cloath them. As seamen had no other way of being supplied with clothes, they would **perish** with sickness in the rainy season that was approaching.

Pearse further stated that the fleet could not protect the St. Johns because it was impracticable for a ship or sloop of war to go into the river or come out again.¹

At last, on July 15, the seamen were ordered on board the ships, and part of them embarked. Oglethorpe sent the following orders to Col. Vander Dussen and Lieut. Col. Cook:

If you find you can't make good the artillery and the Island, persuade them [the Seamen] to

1. SCR, pp. 58-59; Doc. 106.

assist you in embarking it. What cannot be preserved must be destroyed, and the men and craft preserved, you may either send them to St. John's, elsewhere, or here [the mainland] as you think proper. ²

As an extreme measure to save the expedition, the Colonel suggested the General move with his troops to Anastasia in order to keep the Spaniards blockaded until more assistance could be received. This would require building the battery on the bluff to keep the galliots in the harbor, sending the craft into the Matanzas and parties with Indians at all times over to the mainland to harass the Spaniards.

In answer to Vander Dussen's last proposal, Oglethorpe gave the official and positive order to raise the blockade and abandon the siege, in the following terms:

I thank you for giving your Opinion and your Advice will always have a great Weight with me; but for the following Reasons shew the Necessity of raising the Blockade from the Island, and not losing all the Men there. Whilst they are preserved we may keep the Spaniards within bounds; but if they are lost, the Damage to the Province of Carolina will be very great.

First. To block up St. Augustine three Parties are necessary, the first on Cartell, the second on the Main, and the third on Anastasia.

Second. Keeping that Island will not block the Town by Water, as appears by the Succours which came newly from the Havanna in Sloops and landed in the Town Yesterday.

Third. If we could not block the Town by Water with the Assistance of the Men of War, much less without.

Fourth. If the Galleys come out as soon as the Men of War are gone, those on the Island are blockaded. The Loss of them and the Artillery will be greater than raising the Blockade of St. Augustine. I am no Judge of the Sea, nor whether the Craft can go into the Matanzas; but if they can, the Succours

2. SCR, p. 59; Doc. 107.

that can go into the Metansas may come in here, and there is less Danger of their attacking our Craft whilst the Men of War are in Sight, and supported by your Schooner and Logie's Sloop.

I therefore prefer the saving of Men and also the Artillery if possible. The Mortars are the first therefore to be carried off, the Cannon and all the Warlike Stores. Nothing should be destroyed, but what can't be carried off with Safety to the Men.

Upon the Crafts being sent off I approve of your passing with the rest to Cape Cartell, and thence to join me. We will play a hard Game upon them, and do not doubt to restrain the Spanish Garrison, keeping them in Awe till the Craft is safe, and will assist and support you to the last Man. You'll send the Craft under the Convoy of the Men of War, if they can stay for them, to Frederica or Charles Town. The Prize, with Logie, should go into St. John's, and defend that.

This is my Disposition, which I only mention as Advice, to be judged of as you find necessary. But what follows are Orders.

ORDERS

Lieutenant Col. Cook and Col. Vander Dussen to raise the Blockade from the Island of Anastatia, and carry off the Train and Troops with the least Loss you can prevent; but to spoil rather than leave the Artillery. And this shall be your Authority for so doing. 3

Despite all the solicitation of Vander Dussen, both by letters and word or mouth to Pearse and the other naval officers, all the seamen were taken off from the island and carried aboard the men-of-war on July 16. Those men were paid by Oglethorpe's orders 12 pence sterling per diem each for their assistance in landing and mounting the artillery. They had landed on Anastasia the artillery belonging to South Carolina without the Colonel's orders, but they

3. SCR, pp. 59-61; Docs. 108, 109.

refused to put them on board again. The seamen were permitted by the naval officers only to draw off the two 18-pounders from the lower battery but one was dropped at low water mark, and five 18-pounders more "lay up and down which they had landed but were never mounted." At night all the men-of-war set sail with very fair weather, except the Phoenix and Tartar.

About 10 in the morning, when the General moved out of his camp towards St. Augustine, a body of about 300 horse and foot came out to meet him. Upon his advancing and a shell being thrown at the same time from Point Quartell, the Spaniards discharged their pieces and drove back again full speed. In a short time they came out again and kept firing but at such a distance that only two Englishmen were slightly wounded. A small party of the British advanced, beating the Grenadiers march very near to the castle, upon which they all retired in again as fast as before.

From the 16th to the 18th the main activity at Anastasia was hauling down the artillery and other stores from the advanced and lower battery, and embarking them. From the castle some shots were fired "upon the people at work."⁴

Early in the morning of July 17 one Benjamin Bayley--an Irishman who had been helping to bring off the artillery and had seen the guns dismounted--was taken by a free Negro scout in the marsh opposite the town. He had been attempting to desert over to the galliots. Bayley was tried by a court martial held by the officers of the Carolina Regiment, condemned to be shot the next day, and the sentence sent to Oglethorpe. The sentence having been approved by the General, at 10 o'clock of the next day the Carolina Regiment was under arms by orders of the Colonel. Soon after the man was shot. Perceiving an inclination to desert among others who "either had masters to return to or were in debt in Carolina," the Colonel caused his whole regiment "to pass by the dead body, man by man, and to return to their places, then going to the head of the regiment made a short and proper speech upon the occasion." A few days before the Spaniards had shot four men for desertion also.⁵

That Vander Dussen was against the order to raise the blockade is shown in the following two letters written from Anastasia, the 16th and 17th of July; the first was to Oglethorpe:

I hope by Tomorrow to get most of our Cannon
on board and then shall hasten the Embarkation
of the Troops. I cannot help thinking that we

4. SCR, 61-63; Docs. 110, 32, 55, 111, 112.

5. SCR, pp. 62-64.

never shall have such an Opportunity as we have now, for if we send our Craft round into the Metansas, and make a Battery upon the Bluff, I will undertake to defend the Place and keep them from all Communication to the Havanna or elsewhere, and that with two hundred Men more than what I have now, till we get Supplies from the Colonies. Your Excellency told me your Reasons for raising the Blockade was that while the Men of War were here we could not stop them from bringing Provisions from the Havanna. The Reason was because the Metansas was open, and no Battery upon the Bluff which alone will stop all Passage both from the Metansas and Musquitoes.

In a boat dispatched ahead with about 40 sick men of the Carolina Regiment, the Colonel sent the following letter to Lieut. Governor Bull of South Carolina:

I wrote you at large of all our Transactions hitherto. I am now getting the Guns and Mortars shipped off for the other Side, and hope to be ready Tomorrow to make my Retreat, which I hope to perform without any Loss. But what the General designs to do then, I do not know. He says that he designs to keep upon the Land Side, but I am almost sure that staying there is the least of his Thoughts. And indeed I think will be of no Service after raising the Blockade upon this Island.

We had the Whole in our Power, and still might recover if we were to keep this Island, upon the Success of which I durst pawn my Life. I have done all I could against leaving the Blockade both by Words and Letters. But he is deaf to all. For what Reason the Lord knows! I wrote him Yesterday, a Copy of which you have annexed.

I have sent this Boat with the sick, and as soon as we get out shall send all the rest to St. John's, where they shall remain till I have other Orders.⁶

6. SCR, pp. 62-63; Docs. 112, 114.

In the afternoon of the 19th the Colonel ordered all the tents, except his own and those on the front line which were in sight of the castle, to be struck, and sent them on board the craft with all the rest of the luggage. Late in the evening he struck the rest of the tents and sent them on board. Then the regiment was "drawn up and lay on their arms;" the Providence Schooner and the rest of the transportation vessels and boats were instructed to fall down to the bar and be ready to go over to Point Quartell in the morning.

Next day, between two and three in the morning, the Colonel marched down to the water side with all the regiment, except his own company and the Company of Grenadiers; after seeing the troops embark in good order, he then sent for the two other companies and saw them also embark a little after sunrise without the least confusion. Then he himself went off in a small boat "having left nothing behind" him on the island, but an 18-pounder gun from the lower battery that had been split. There was a great swell upon the bar which caused the largest of the vessels to thump upon it and beat off the keel of the Providence Schooner. But the tide being favorable and the wind not too strong, some of the 14 boats were rowed and others towed until they got over in safety to Point Quartell.

Vander Dussen had ordered the drums of the last companies to beat the "Reveillie" and the sentries to pass the word in order to deceive the Spaniards.

But by that Time the Sun was up, not seeing the English Colours nor any of our People they fired from the Castle upon the advanced Battery, and no Return being made from thence, some of them ventured ashore upon the Island. By this Time all our Craft were got over the Bar.

Then the Galleys dropped down opposite to Point Quartell Battery, where Ensign Mace was with about fifty of the General's Soldiers, and fired very briskly upon them. They hulled the Georgia Petiagua lying there. Ensign Mace returned some Shot from the two Six Pounders lying on the Sands. Col. Vander Dussen, expecting that they would make a Descent from the Galleys, immediately landed with the Company of Grenadiers; and Lieut. Col. Lejau also with twenty Men more in a Row Boat. The Company of Grenadiers, being ordered to the Assistance of Ensign Mace, the Galleys retired. Lieut. Col. Cook had sailed early in the Morning by the General's Directions for St. John's who carried off the Mortar at that Point and two Guns.

In the afternoon the craft had landed all the Carolina Regiment on Point Quartell, "which then lay upon their arms on the spot where they had had their first camp on that Point."

Seeing Capts. Fanshaw and Townshend under sail, the Colonel went aboard and convinced them to stay till night and convoy the Carolina craft to St. Johns. Then he ordered all the craft to sail in the evening with the Captains. As the regiment would retreat by land to the St. Johns, two row boats were left behind to go along shore and attend the regiment with provisions.⁷

Meanwhile, Oglethorpe sent orders from his camp near Fort Mose to Capt. Dunbar and Ensign Mace--who were at Point Quartell--to burn and destroy everything belonging to the General's regiment that they could not carry away, and to retire to St. Johns. Dunbar, returning to the Mose camp, left Mace as commanding officer, and in the evening the Ensign put Oglethorpe's orders in execution. He began by burning the "Petiaqua" and more than 100 pounds sterling worth of provisions consisting of bread, flour, hams, cheese, butter, beer, and the like. The Georgia soldiers were loth to part with the liquor, and therefore drank very heartily of it. In that plight they burned next the clothe, spare muskets, etc. One of the muskets was loaded and while burning discharged and shot Mace in the thigh. Three six-pounders belonging to the Phoenix **were buried by the soldiers in the sands.**

While the men were burning the provisions and other supplies, there were two of their row boats lying at the Point, empty, that might have carried off everything. Having made this havoc, the soldiers, leaving everything else behind them, marched, or rather rambled, over at night into the Carolina camp.⁸

About the same time Oglethorpe retired with his regiment from his camp near Mose to Fort Diego. On July 24 he described his retreat to Vander Dussen as follows:

I marched with Drums beating and Colours flying the same Night you left Point Quartell and encamped near Augustine, expecting the Spaniards would have made a Sally, for which Purpose I stayed some Time the next Morning and marched gently on to the Brook by Yareway and that Evening to the Grove; and the next Morning reached this Place.

7. SCR, pp. 64-65; Doc. 120.

8. SCR, p. 65; Docs. 116, 120.

I have had none deserted, left **none** behind, nor lost a Man from hence. I have sent out Parties to Quartell and Augustine to see what they are doing. Their Galleys advanced six Miles up the River St. Diego and then returned. But by Land they have made no Advances at all. I send down to Augustine a Party of the Indians this Day to attack any Parties that come out.⁹

When the Colonel came ashore on Point Quartell and was informed about the burning of provisions and supplies, he said that if he had been informed about **the** orders of Oglethorpe he would have "carried off the provisions." About midnight he sent a party of his regiment to the Point where the Georgia soldiers had camped.

Before daybreak--July 21--the party came back with several swivel guns, hand grenades, shovels, pick axes, and many other supplies; everything was put on board the Colonel's row boats together with the wounded Ensign.

In the morning, Vander Dussen ordered the "Reveillie to be beat." The Georgia men set off along the beach for St. Johns, about 35 miles away. Between eight and nine o'clock, the Carolina Regiment followed, having been detained till that time in fetching one thing or other from the Point which Oglethorpe's men had left there. "Thus nothing was left at that place, but the three guns which they had buried in the sands."

About two o'clock in the afternoon the regiment reached the Palmetto Hut, where there was a watering place. Because it was very hot they halted there until the dusk of evening, when they marched again and halted at another **watering place, a little more** than half way to St. Johns. The same evening, Oglethorpe halted his regiment at a place called the Grove and next day in the morning (July 22) reached San Diego.¹⁰

At daybreak, the Carolina Regiment marched again and about 10 o'clock reached the St. Johns River where it found that all the Carolina craft had arrived safely; it encamped about half a mile nearer to the sea than before. In all its long march during hot weather, the regiment found only two or three watering places. Many of the men had weakened and not being able to keep up with the regiment, arrived afterwards.

9. SCR, Doc. 121.

10. SCR, pp. 65-66; Docs. 116-18.

On the 25th some of Oglethorpe's men arrived at the camp of St. Johns, and reported that he intended to burn Fort Diego and everything there and retire to the river. Next day in the evening the regiment reached the St. Johns, and one of the officers related that

he left Fort Diego without burning it and with the Addition of a Ditch and Breast-work round it. That three of their Men deserted from Diego, and two from Point Quartell the Night before the Carolina Regiment marched from thence. That Diego Spinosa's Brother came out after them with a small Party of Negroes and Indians to see whether the General was gone and whether he had burnt Fort Diego; and that the Indians with the General (viz., the Chickasaw, as it appeared afterwards) scalped some of them and having taken Diego's Brother they would not part with him to the General upon any Consideration, but carried him off.

About nine o'clock Oglethorpe himself came into the camp at St. Johns.¹¹

Oglethorpe's previous statement to Vander Dussen, that when the former retired from the vicinity of St. Augustine the Spaniards "made no advances at all," is at variance with the General's description of the retreat given to New Castle on July 30:

The Spaniards made a sally, with about 500 men, on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Cathcart with twenty men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of 100 men to attack them; I followed with the body. We drove them into the works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched with drums beating and colours flying, in the day, from my camp near the town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day I marched nine miles, where I encamped that night. We discovered a party of Spanish horse and Indians whom we charged, took one horseman and killed two Indians; the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. John's river, waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me farther to do for the safety of

11. SCR, pp. 66-68; Doc. 122.

these provinces, which I think are very much exposed to the half-galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be defended by a few men.¹²

And to Lieut. Governor Bull, he gave the following version of the retreat:

Cook and Col. Vander Dussen got every Thing on board from Anastasia, and all the Craft came in safe hither. After the Craft were sailed Col. Vander Dussen landed by my Orders on Point Quartell, and marched from thence to St. John's. I marched at first towards the Town, then turned and encamped three Miles from it, the next Day I marched about seven Miles more, and halted that Night to see if I could draw them to venture any Men out from Augustine; and next Day to Fort St. Diego, where a Party of their Horse, Negroes and Indians, attempting to pursue us were charged and beaten, one Spanish Horseman taken, and two Indians killed, and the rest ran very fast to the Town. I joined Col. Vander Dussen at this Camp, where we are in a Condition at any Time to march back and attack Augustine if Strength sufficient should arrive, having all our Provisions and Artillery ready on board the Craft.

It is absolutely necessary, if Augustine is not taken, to pursue some Measures to restrain the Half Galleys; for the Mischief they can do along the Coast is inconceivable.¹³

Oglethorpe instructed Vander Dussen to stay in Florida until word was received from Carolina in connection with what measures should be taken against the Spaniards. Lieut. Governor Bull was doing the best he could to send assistance in order to continue the blockade, if nothing more could be done. At one time the Colonel asked the General "what he designed to do," and he replied that he would only refresh his men and then march back to St. Augustine; that if they could march back in one day, the Spaniards, thinking they were gone, would be liable to be surprised.

12. CRG, XXXV, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, p. 153.

13. SCR, Doc. 129, July 30.

On July 30 the Colonel sent a party of 50 men of his regiment to view all the avenues between the camp and Fort Diego, to see if any of the Spaniards were out that way. At the same time the General sent an Ensign and 40 men of his forces to the Palmetto Hut in order to launch a boat that was ashore there.

Next day in the morning the General's party returned, having lost a sergeant, a corporal and three men by desertion. In this connection the Colonel wrote to Lieut. Governor Bull:

Yesterday the General sent out a Party of forty Men; the Serjeant, Corporal and three Men of which Party deserted from the Head of the Command with their Arms and Accoutrements, and about fourteen have deserted from him before, which Spirit of Desertion, if it continue, may be of Dangerous Consequence.

I desire your Honour will send me Orders what I am to do as soon as possible, for our People grow very sickly.¹⁴

In the evening, the party which Vander Dussen had sent out the day before returned into the camp. In the night three more men of the General's regiment deserted.

On August 1 Oglethorpe's men threatened to go away in whole parties if they were not carried back. This obliged him to embark all of them in the evening--except his body guard--and send them over to St. George's Island. Next morning, after striking their flag, the regiment marched off to Frederica.

Vander Dussen still remained with the Carolina Regiment on the south side of the St. Johns, waiting for orders from Lieut. Governor Bull and the arrival of a expected relief schooner and also to protect some men the General had sent up to destroy Fort Pupo.

In the evening, a free Negro scout and some Indians came to the St. Johns camp and reported that they had found the tracks of several Spanish Indians; they were ordered to keep out all night, and the regiment to be under arms at the usual time of three o'clock in the morning.¹⁵

All the baggage of the regiment was ordered aboard in the afternoon of August 3. As the men whom Oglethorpe sent to destroy Fort Pupo

14. SCR, pp. 68-73; Docs. 123-26, 130.

15. SCR, p. 73; Docs. 131-33, 136.

had returned, Col. Vander Dussen embarked all his regiment on board the Carolina craft in order to return home.

On the 7th, at four in the afternoon, all the vessels arrived at the camp of St. Simon's, where they found the man-of-war Tartar. Here the Colonel received by the scout boat the following orders from the Lieut. Governor, dated July 30:

I herewith send you a Copy of the Resolution of the General Assembly in relation to the Forces employed in the Pay of this Province to assist in the Expedition against St. Augustine, by which you will see that I am desired to give Orders for the immediate Return of the Forces under your Command in the Pay of this Province.

I do therefore hereby order and direct that you with all convenient Speed do embark in the Vessels and Boats belonging to, and in the Pay of, this Province, the Troops under your Command, with the Cannon, small Arms, Ammunition and other warlike Stores, Indian Presents &c. belonging to this Province; and to make the best of your Way with them to Charles Town, to which Place I wish you a good Passage and safe Arrival.¹⁶

Next day the Colonel landed all his men at St. Simon's; the same day Oglethorpe's troops arrived there from St. Andrews.

On August 14, the vessels carrying the South Carolina Regiment set sail from St. Simon's, but contrary winds forced them to put into the Savannah River from the 17th to the 23rd. On August 24 the regiment arrived safely at Charleston. Only 14 men were missing--seven died of flux, one of quinzy, four by different accidents, one deserted and another had been shot for attempt to desert.¹⁷

Oglethorpe himself, sick of fever, and his regiment worn out with fatigue and rendered unfit for action by a flux, had reach Frederica the first week of August.¹⁸

Thus ended the unsuccessful expedition of Oglethorpe against St. Augustine, to the great disappointment of Georgia and Carolina.

16. SCR, pp. 74-75; Doc. 135.

17. SCR, pp. 75-76; Doc. 136.

18. SCR, Doc. 136; Jones, op. cit., pp. 335-36.

2. Effects of the Attack

"I cannot arrive at a comprehension of the conduct, or rules of this General," wrote Montiano, concerning the withdrawal of the British troops. After all, he said, at least 12 British deserters informed him that the British camp was composed of 370 of his regiment, 600 militia of Carolina, 130 Indians, and 200 sailors armed and encamped on the island of Anastasia, and as many more sailors for the management of the sloops, schooners, and launches.

Due to the haste of the retreat, they had abandoned four 6-pounders on the battery of Point Quartell¹, one schooner, two **kegs** of gunpowder, several muskets and **escopettes**, and set fire to boxes of bacon, cheese, lard, dried beef, rice and beans, to a schooner, and to an excellent mortar carriage; they left also many things that were useful to the Spanish Indians and galley slaves who found several barrels of lard, flour, and pork.

The formal siege lasted 38 days, counting from the 13th of June to the 20th of July, and the fire of the batteries and bombardment 27 days, from the 24th of June to the 20th of July. There were 14 guns in the three British batteries: (1) Advanced battery of Anastasia, opposite the castle and on a point called La Loza--four 18-pounders and one 9-pounder; (2) Lower battery on the north of Anastasia, at a point called the Hammock--two 18-pounders; (3) Battery on the inside coast of Point Quartell--seven 6-pounders, five of iron and two of brass. There were also 34 mortars--two large ones throwing shells of half a quintal, two others of about a quintal, and 30 small ones, which the British deserters called **coehorns**, some firing small hand grenades and others of 10 or 12 pounds.¹

How ineffective was the bombardment was explained by resident engineer Ruiz de Olano as follows:

Twenty-seven consecutive days of incessant fire during which this fort did not receive much damage, although its parapets sustained some injury owing to their being too weak and not sufficiently thick; some of the old parapets were demolished, and the **new** ones suffered very much owing to their recent construction. But no time has been lost in endeavoring to repair the damage to the best of our means and ability--and **at present are** entirely repaired.

1. EFP, Doc. 205, July 28; SC, Governor Montiano to the King, August 9. See also map of Engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano, August 8, 1740, showing location of British camps and batteries.

Owing to the nature of its construction materials, the bombardment produced little effect on the sea walls of the castle. Its spongy, infrangible walls received the cannon balls like a cotton ball, or sand battery.

Notwithstanding the enemy's placing an 18-pounder battery within a distance of 870 toesas from this fort, yet, they caused the aforesaid damage to the parapets, because of the stone of which they are built being porous and soft. The balls did not penetrate into the walls of the fort more than a foot and a half, but the parapets as they were less thick, when a ball penetrated a foot and a half, they would tear up the stones and scatter them around.

While reconstructing the parapets, Olano examined the walls and found out that where they supported the bastions the walls were not strong enough and therefore could not support thicker parapets. But the walls of the curtains were two feet thicker than those of the bastions; as they could support heavier weights, their parapets could be built thicker.

Olano warned that if next spring Oglethorpe decided to besiege the town again, as he had publicly said, it was possible that he would plant his siege batteries on the mainland and nearer to the castle in order to utilize every shot from his guns; in this case he would no doubt succeed in destroying the parapets and dismounting the guns. As the parapet of the covered way had not as yet been connected with the terreplein of the explanade--only the banquette and stockade having being completed--it would be very easily demolished at the beginning of the siege.

Fortunately for the Spaniards, British intelligence in connection with the real strength of the town on the landward side was misleading. As Olano said, the entrenchment line of palmetto and earthen parapet--called the Cubo Line--which ran from the castle westward to the San Sebastian Creek, was a feeble defense, not only because of the weakness of the parapet and narrowness and little depth of the ditch that paralleled it, but also "because the bastions owing to their small size are only capable of accommodating very few men, and the curtains being very extensive and the force small for their proper defense."²

2. Olano to the King, August 8, 1740, SC 6-9, AGI 87-1-2/114.

That the British batteries of Anastasia were clumsily prepared and ineffective, especially after the affair of Mose, was recognized in the depositions of various British officers. During the bombardment from Anastasia, there was almost a continual firing on both sides, the British throwing "a great number of shells and shot but with no certainty, some going over the castle, some falling short, numbers of shells frequently bursting in the air."³ Lieut. Jonathan Bryan, of the Volunteers, thought that the two batteries of Anastasia were "of no service against the castle, the inhabitants being seen going in and out of the town, driving their cattle to or from feeding."⁴ Capt. Wright, also of the Volunteers, said that

he believes not one of twenty of the shells fell into the town or castle, but either burst in the air or fell short; and whenever a shell was thrown notice was given of it in the town by the ringing of a bell. That the inhabitants were seen going in and out of the town daily, some times driving cattle. That Lieut. Colonel Cook, allowed to be the most experienced Engineer as well as officer present, declared in his hearing that the batteries were of no service.⁵

According to Friar San Francisco Buena Ventura, resident of St. Augustine, the town was saved because it was under the protection of the Virgin Mary. People did not run away when the shots and bombs fell, they just "hailed Ave Mary" every time the warning bell was rung; that although the bombs fell between the people, only two persons died and two others were wounded, "perhaps because they did not hail Ave Mary."⁶

Montiano informed that the two dead were an artillerist and a convict killed by gun shot, and the wounded a soldier and a slave; the soldier finally recovered but the slave lost a leg. Not a single shell fell inside the castle.

Spanish artillery, apparently, was as ineffective as that of the British. There is no record as to how the artillery was dis-

3. SCR, Doc. 137.

4. SCR, Doc. 28.

5. SCR, Doc. 42.

6. Buena Ventura account, op. cit.

tributed, but the following pieces were available at the time of the siege:⁷

33-pounders	1
24- "	2
18- "	5
15- "	6
8- "	15
7- "	6
6- "	6
5- "	17
4- "	8
3- "	7
2- "	<u>1</u>
Total	74

Montiano was all praise for his people, but acknowledged that in the midst of the great dangers, gossip ran riot.

The constancy, valor and glory of the officers here are beyond all praise; the patriotism, courage and steadiness of the troops, militia, free negroes, and convicts, have been great. These last I may say to Your Excellency, have borne themselves like veteran soldiers. I especially commend their humble devotion, for without ceasing work by day, they have **persevered by night** with the care and vigilance of old soldiers.

Even among the slaves a particular steadiness has been noticed, and a desire not to await the enemy within the place but to go out to meet him. In short, I have been thoroughly satisfied with all during the siege. . . And lastly, Your Excellency may believe that the galliots have been of great service to me: for if the siege had caught me without them, the **English** would have given me much work to do, as the launches could have been used for nothing but the guard of this port, to say nothing of the necessity of taking other indispensable measures, at great cost.

7. Report of Don Francisco Navarro, Sept. 6, 1740, SC, AGI- 58-1-32/23; SC, Montiano to the King, Aug. 9.

He singled out the excellent service provided by the militias.⁸

Although there was no doubt that the galliots had saved the city, the governor informed Guemes that Capt. Fandino was not fit to command them because he had been remiss in obeying his orders, and with a very little risk could have dismounted the **principal** battery of Anastasia; during the last day of the **English** retreat he could have also prevented the escape of some of the embarcation vessels.⁹

Spanish losses during the whole campaign--May-July--are difficult to **determine**. Like the British, the Spaniards always tried to minimize their casualties and inflate those of the enemy. Montiano's estimates, or exact count of his losses amounted to about 125 men, among killed, wounded and prisoners. He breaks down the losses as follows: one sergeant, 10 soldiers and one Indian made prisoners during the capture of Fort Pupo; 48 soldiers, artillerymen, **sailors**, and **officers** made also prisoners on board the sloop that was captured together with 6,000 pesos she had on **board** belonging to the garrison subsidy; two sergeants, 24 soldiers, nine cavalrymen, and three Indians captured during the fall of Fort Diego; three soldiers captured by the Matanzas while on their way to relieve the **guard** on duty and carrying the mail; one soldier captured on his way from Apalache to St. Augustine bearing dispatches; one ensign and 11 soldiers who died, and two other persons wounded during the sally to Fort Mose; two persons who died outside of the town; an artilleryist and a convict who died during the bombardment and a soldier and a slave wounded. The above figures give 102 prisoners, 18 dead, and five wounded. Montiano, of course, did not mention those who deserted.¹⁰

British casualties of all kinds mentioned in the Carolina and Georgia documents amounted to about 150, including 22 deserters and 35 prisoners. How many really died of diseases remain a mystery. The season was the hottest of the year, and that sickness prevailed extensively among the English troops is too evident. About 100 years after the siege the sea uncovered a great quantity of human bones in the neighborhood of the British camps. Pearse's forces were also greatly reduced by the number of sick on board.¹¹

8. EFP, Doc. 205; SC 6-10, AGI 87-3-12/14, August 11, 1740. Montiano's assertion that no one deserted during the siege was a deliberate piece of misinformation.

9. EFP, Doc. 205.

10. SC, Montiano to the King, August. 9.

11. The Southern Quarterly Review, Vol. V (Charleston, 1844), p. 412; SCR, Docs. 104, 106.

In their invasion, the British destroyed all the Spanish cattle, except some that the governor had gathered in the city previous to the siege, and which served as sustenance during the attack. They carried the horse stock with them, remaining only a few herds, "which will take many years to improve, or to reach their former state-- Altogether, hardly one hundred head of cattle are left."¹²

In the wake of the English retreat many rumors were left behind. All the British deserters and two Spanish squaws who escaped from them agreed in saying that Oglethorpe was going to reorganize his forces and make a great effort to stir up the Indians; that he had gone for reinforcements with the intention of returning next spring.

On their retreat the British spread the news that they would burn the forts of San Diego and Pupo, but the former was abandoned without being burned. The latest English deserter said that the General was going to construct a battery of six guns on the opposite side of the St. Johns to prevent the entrance of galliots and in order to maintain Pupo. Other deserters declared that it was the intention of Oglethorpe to withdraw with his entire regiment--now 378 men out of 600 it originally contained--to Frederica, and fortify himself there; other deserters believed he was going over to London for fresh reinforcements.

Montiano thought that this was the proper moment to destroy Oglethorpe with his regiment and force him out of Georgia, but with forces stronger than those he had in St. Augustine; that the General's troops were discontented, and he would get but little help from Carolina "by reason of the same discontent, and fear of their Negroes."

Up to August 3, Montiano had not received positive information that the British had withdrawn from the St. Johns, although the latest deserters had assured him that the enemy forces were to embark on Friday the 5th. To verify this news, and that of the British having sent a few launches to pick up the guns of Fort Pupo and demolish it, the governor kept out various patrols of cavalry and Indians.

Montiano did not think it was proper for him to follow the British rearguard because of lack of troops; out of the eight companies of reinforcements alone, more than 100 men were lacking. Besides, the troops were worn out and it was not wise to expose the castle. But he hoped finally to chastise and give **the British an exterminating blow.**¹³

12. SC, Montiano to the King, August 9.

13. EFP, Docs. 205, July 28; 207, August 3. Pupo was burned after the British guns and garrison were withdrawn.

Besides the intelligence given by the 22 British deserters who reached St. Augustine--to the effect that Oglethorpe had circulated the rumor that he meant to return within four or five months, or next spring--they added that he planned to build galliots similar to those of the Spaniards, but of greater burden.

Montiano wrote to Guemes that although it appeared impossible to him that Oglethorpe should repeat the siege of St. Augustine because of the arduous difficulties he would encounter in bringing the settlers of Carolina a second time to his way of thinking, it was possible because the entire system of

the citizens of those colonies and of their neighbors, consists and dwells in the desire to capture this place, the reef on which ordinarily they break, and the obstacle to the course of their inhuman and haughty plan of exterminating the Indians of the continent of Apalachee and its confines so as to occupy all these provinces without let or hindrance, it seems logical to me not to spurn their warnings, because it may of course happen that, thoroughly distrusting the conduct of Oglethorpe, they may in case the war continue, ask the King of Great Britian to commit the direction of affairs to some other soldier whose conciliatory character may give them better satisfaction. If this happens, as is possible, or if the same Oglethorpe should again have charge, he may succeed in bewitching them into the belief that another greater expedition is necessary against this place, for obviously we must assume that the new attempt and attack would be undertaken with double forces at least. And if his court should be inclined to grant the two regiments or the two thousand troops, as divulged, because of the advantage to that Crown of holding this province, then will it be most necessary to send equal forces; for, seeing that this place is an open country, its defense should be guarded more than any other thing. There can infallibly be no other worse nor more deplorable condition, than our reduction to the limits of the fort; if this happens, which God forbid, it is equally infallible that we could not exist for any length of time. Without taking into consideration any other reason or principle, the sad voices and tears of the

women and children, were enough to distract their fathers from the best laid, logical plans. I keep in mind Your Excellency's grave preoccupations with the defense of that island (Cuba), beautiful woman whom all nations are wooing, but I also believe that Your Excellency, zealous in the King's service, will make a special study of coming to the relief of this place with all that it needs.¹⁴

If the war continued, the governor needed 370 infantrymen and 24 artillerymen, and he explained why. Before and during the siege, and counting the men not fit for duty, the regular garrison and the eight companies of reinforcements were reduced by 370. That is, of a total of 750 men that both corps should have by **dotation**, there were only no more than 356 men left between the garrison and the reinforcements. **Of an authorized strength of 350 men, the regular garrison had only 116 fit for duty.** Montiano also asked for 300 armed men more--mulattoes and free Negroes from the militia of Cuba.¹⁵

Some interesting details about the effects of the siege are provided by the mate of an English merchant vessel captured by a Spanish privateer sloop from St. Augustine. He was brought as a prisoner to town but had the liberty of talking to the people. He heard from several persons, but more especially from one Italian named John **Delorem**--who spoke English, Spanish and French--that during the "last days" of the **siege** the soldiers were so "reduced" that for want of provisions they were forced to kill and eat cats; that if they had not received provisions from the Spanish relief vessels, they would have been obliged to surrender the town and castle in a short time; that when the vessels arrived the Spaniards had so many Indians, Negroes, women and children in the town that they did not have enough provisions to keep them alive one week.¹⁶

The above prisoner further stated that while he was in St. Augustine there was a mutiny among the convict laborers; they attempted to take the Castillo but were discovered by the Spaniards. If they had succeeded, their intention was to hold and defend the castle until they received aid from Oglethorpe.^{16a}

14. EFP, Doc. 210, August 7.

15. Ibid.

16. The situation was not that critical; the Spaniards were on half rations and supplies were available for more than a week. There was still at hand a good supply of cattle.

16a. Deposition of David Cutler Braddock, Frederica, January 31/40/1, in CRG, XXXV, p. 164.

Felix Aguilar was a Spanish horseman serving with the troops of Don Pedro Lamberto Horruytiner. He was taken prisoner by the Creeks near St. Augustine and later sent to Frederica. Aguilar declared that when the provisions came from Habana, the Spaniards had left 12 or 14 day provisions at half allowance. He stated that the main part of the Spanish soldiers were kept upon the entrenchments on the land side of the castle, and that they were resolved to defend the place to the last; that there were no troops on the water side because it was covered by the castle and the galliots.¹⁷

As a last thought it may be said that Oglethorpe, like Moore in 1702, found not a strong place in St. Augustine, but like him, was opposed by the patient fortitude of a determined people. Montiano himself sustained the siege with skill, courage, and perseverance. He reaped no laurels in a bloody field, but he protected his people from injury, and by the exercise of singular discretion, preserved the province of Florida for Spain.

17. Deposition of Felix Aguilar, Frederica, May 4, 1741, in CRG, XXXV, p. 195.

Recapitulation

As Oglethorpe returned to Frederica, the amity between South Carolina and Georgia had vanished in a cloud of charges and counter-charges. For some time the defeat embittered the relations between the two English colonies. Oglethorpe and other Georgia officers accused the South Carolina militia of failing to cooperate in crisis. Naturally the Carolinians resented these insinuations and authorized their Assembly to make a full investigation of the affair. A committee was selected to undertake the inquiry and after a year of preparation it presented a notably impartial report which cleared the Carolina troops, refuted Oglethorpe's contentions, and pointed out the basic reasons for the failure of the expedition. It was both the personal limitations of Oglethorpe as commander and a series of untoward circumstances, **which he could not have foreseen**, the basic reasons for the defeat of the expedition at the gates of the old Spanish colonial city.

What follows are some of the most important general observations made by the signatories of the South Carolina report; their observations were strengthened by the numerous depositions and documents which were incorporated as appendices.

Oglethorpe's original arrangement with South Carolina was to begin the siege of St. Augustine before provisions and troops arrived from Cuba. A vigorous and sudden attack was to be made upon the town; if that was accomplished and the people forced into the castle, the British were immediately to bombard it and keep out any supply of provisions. If that attempt failed, then to lay siege to the place. A most important part of the scheme was the element of surprise.

But Oglethorpe's landing in Florida after the minor incident of Amelia, and the attack of Pupo and Picolata, were injudicious movements which put the Spaniards on the alert, encouraged concentration on their part and foreshadowed an immediate demonstration in force against the castle.

From the time he landed back in Florida (May 20) to the day when he showed himself with the army before St. Augustine, everything he did tended manifestly to alarm the place before hand, and to prevent the surprise upon which the success of the expedition depended. He attacked Fort San Diego and spent about three weeks more sending out parties towards St. Augustine to reconnoiter and parties back to St. John's to fetch daily provisions. During all

this time the Spaniards at St. Augustine had frequent opportunities of knowing both the arrival and the number of the British forces.

At last he marched from Fort San Diego with all his forces to St. Augustine, and on June 13 halted within two miles of it. All the men-of-war had showed themselves the day before off the bar. He had not a single mortar, siege gun, and was very scarce of ammunition and provisions. At this time then was expected that he should have endeavored to push into the town, and force the inhabitants into the castle. Palmer's suggestion to burn the town was rejected as being too risky and the attack came to nothing.

It was the opinion of several officers that the General should have landed the army at Picolata, about 18 miles away from St. Augustine and a good access road. Instead he landed at the mouth of the St. Johns, 45 miles distant and by way of a bad road.

Oglethorpe left the bar of St. John's in May and moved into Florida before the arrival of the Commodore and Col. Vander Dussen, so that nothing was concerted between the three leaders. With the exception of an accidental meeting at Anastasia, the General never called any one general council of war during the whole expedition. This lack of coordination was responsible for the fatal step of Oglethorpe's leaving the mainland and landing on Anastasia, a decision reached by the General and the Commodore without consulting the Carolina Colonel. Oglethorpe himself seemed to have paid more attention to the opinion of the sea-captains than to **experienced** militia officers like Palmer, Vander Dussen, Barnwell, Cook, and others.

After landing at Anastasia, **Oglethorpe kept his forces broken** up into fragments unable to support one another--at the island, Point Quarter, Mose, Fort San Diego, Palmetto Hut and at St. John's. This disposition of troops was not proper either for a siege or blockade. The batteries of Anastasia proved to be a total failure. Even if a breach in the sea walls of the castle had been made, there was nothing that Oglethorpe could have done from Anastasia but to stand and look at the crumbling walls. If the General, not willing to hazard his men by attacking the town from the land side, had been content only with keeping it close blockaded a few weeks with all his forces on the main, while the men-of-war (who had undertaken to do it) prevented any supply of provisions by the sea, a speedy surrender might have ensued.

Fort Mose's fiasco was due in part to the faulty **deployment** of troops and to the regular officers' disdain for the provincial soldiers.

If there was a great failure, it was the blockade. With the exception of Warren, Townsend, and Laws, the other sea captains

found difficulties in everything and were unconcerned with solutions. Due to the negligence of a sea captain, the six galliots and two sloops loaded with provisions slipped through the bar of Matanzas in April. As late as June 22 Montiano was able to write Guemes that **the bar of Matanzas was not effectively occupied and there remained** means of getting succors. When the relief vessels came, Montiano sent small boats and brought provisions through Matanzas as he had stated it could be done.

After Pearse's refusal to continue to blockade, all efforts of Vander Dussen to attack the galliots were always restrained by councils of war held on board the flagship. Both the aloofness and unconcern of the sea-captains and Oglethorpe's lack of a vigorous alternative plan were the main causes for the failure of the blockade. Perhaps the sea captains were more cautious of risking the lives of their seamen than they would otherwise had been, because they had not received particular orders to give all assistance to the siege.¹ Both Oglethorpe and Pearse, wrote a naval historian, "proved themselves indifferent leaders; the former, though he developed the idea, was incapable of putting it into execution; the latter saw difficulties everywhere but made little effort to overcome them."²

Though Oglethorpe's expedition was not attended with success, it kept the Spaniards on the defensive for two years and gave the General the opportunity of strengthening the defenses of Frederica. When the Spaniards executed their long-projected invasion of Georgia in 1742, the British colony was able to parry the counter blow and strike back successfully.

1. SCR, pp. XVIII-XXIV, 76-88. The London Magazine, Vol. XXVII (1758), p. 23.

2. H. W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1920), I, pp. 50-51.

Appendix

Letter of Oglethorpe to Newcastle, Florida, July 19 [30], 1740 (CRG, Vol. XXXV, p. 153):

I acquainted Your Grace with my taking of the Forts of St. Francis, Picolata and St. Diego and about eighty prisoners from the Spaniards and also of several Indians joining us, and that the Assembly of Carolina had voted an assistance of one Regiment . . . for besieging Saint Augustine, but it was so late before they got all things ready that the month of May was come in before we got the Rendezvous, whereas we ought to have taken the field at farthest in March. I undertook the siege because St. Augustine in January was scarce of food, the castle had no covered way, the entrenchments round the town were weak, and if the town was taken and the people drove into the castle, a bombardment would soon oblige them to surrender for want of provisions. The troops of the garrison were not compleat and a great number of transport pioneers were in the place desirous to desert. I then laid it down to the people of Carolina that they should take the advantage of that circumstance and immediately invest the town, or at least stop up their communication by sea, which if they did not, succours would come from the Havannah, they would fortify the town, and a bombardment them would be of little service, since the inhabitants would have large room to avoid it, and the season of the year would oblige the men of war to go off the coast, and the troops to retire from the heats or perish with sickness. After I left Charles Town and before we could invest the place, the half galleys got in from Cuba, we had no pioneers to open trenches, no engineers but Colonel Cook and Mr. Mace, no bombardeers nor gunners that understood the service, and no sufficient train. After April the Spaniards pardoned ye transports and compleated the garrison with them and entrenched to town strongly towards the land, however, I agreed with the Commodore if they would attack the half galleys, and the Carolina Regiment attack the sea side of the town I would storm the intrenchments by land.

The fleet landed two hundred men with the Captains Warren, Lawes and Townshend on the Island St. Anastasia, and gave the utmost assistance in putting the few guns and mortars that we had into battery. We summoned the garrison who refused to surrender. We canonaded and bombarded the town for about twenty days. The Commodore acquainted me that upon mature examination the Council of War found it impracticable to attack the half galleys and that on the 5th [16th] July they must be obliged to retire into harbour for fear of hurricane storms. The Indians also acquainted me that the heat and heavy rains would be

unhealthly to keep the field and resolved to return home. About the same time Captain Fanshaw who was cruising off the Metansas, (which is the southern entrance of Augustine) and the Musketoes acquainted ye Commodore that there were seven vessels loaded with provisions . . . had got into the Musketoes, and that he could not get at them. Soon after that advice they got most of their provisions into Augustine.

It being impossible to continue the siege, I prevailed with the men of war to stay some days longer, and ordered Col. Cook and Col. Vander Dussen to embark with the train, ammunition and troops . . . on board the vessels (they being on the Island [Anastasia]) which they did and sent them into this River [St. Johns].

The Spaniards made a sally (with about five hundred men) on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Catheart with twenty men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of one hundred men, to attack them, I followed with the Body [of troops]. We drove them into the works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched with drums beating and colours flying in the day from my camp near the town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day I marched nine miles where I encamped that night. We discovered a party of Spaniards horse and Indians, whom we charged, took one Spanish horseman, and killed two Indians, the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. Johns River waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me further to do for the safety of these provinces, which I think are very much exposed to the half galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be defended by a few men.

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
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ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration No. 1

Location Plan of the 1740 siege.



**FLORIDA COAST FROM
MATANZAS INLET NORTH
TO ST. GEORGE'S ISLAND**

Illustration No. 2

"A View of the Town and Castle of St. Augustine,
and the English Camp before it June 20, 1740," by Thos.
Silver. From Stevens, A History of Georgia (1847),
p. 174, photostat in Library of Congress.

**A VIEW of the TOWN and CASTLE of S^t AUGUSTINE ,
and the ENGLISH CAMP before it June 20 1740. by THO^s SILVER.**




A The English South Trench ^{the} 3 18 & 2 small Mortars
B A Marsh from whence we played with 20 Cohorns
C Eustatia Island, which is chiefly Sand & Bushes
D Sadders hauling Cannon in reach of the Castle
E A North Trench 3 18 & a Mortar of 24 10 m^o
F Gen^l Oglethorpe's Soldiers, Indians & Sadders Tents
G A Look out taken there 12th of June
H Soldiers and Sadders landing June the 11th
I A Small Battery gained at our approach
K Cap^t Warren Commander over the Sadders hauling
the Union's Flag on board a Schooner
L The Sadders wells to Water the Shipping
Ships { 1 Flamborough, 2 Hector, 3 Squirrel
4 Tartar, 5 Phoenix
6 Woolf, 7 Spence
Employed in this Expedition about 200 Seamen
400 Soldiers and 300 Indians
Forces of the Spaniards 1000 besides a Strong
Castle and 4 Fortified Barks and a shallow
River hindring our Loadings Playing on them.

Account of the Siege of S^t Augustine in a Letter from on Board S^t Hector
May 30 we arrived near S^t Augustine, June 1st were joined by the
Flamborough, Cap^t Pearce, the Phoenix, Cap^t Pennington, the Tartar
Cap^t Stansfield, and the Squirrel, Cap^t Warren of 20 guns each. We
sent the Spence Sloop Cap^t Lewis, and the Wolf Cap^t Standridge
On the 2^d Col Vander Dusen with 300 Carolina Soldiers appeared
to the North of the Town. On the 3^d Gen^l Oglethorpe came by
Sea with 300 Soldiers and 300 Indians from Coosaga. On the
10th they were carried ashore in the Men of War's boats under
the cover of the small ships guns. They landed on the Island
Eustatia without opposition and took the Look out at C
The 12th Cap^t Warren in a Schooner and other Armed Ships and
Privateers anchored in their Harbour just out of cannon shot till
the 26th when the Sadders were employed in landing Indianes and
other Stores within Reach of the Enemy's Cannon. In which Operation
they showed a surprising Spirit and Intrepidity. The same night the
Batteries were raised but too far off
The 27th the General summoned the Governours to Surrender, who sent
word he should be glad to shake hands with him on his Castle. This demand
by answer was accompanied by a dear bought Victory which 300 Spaniards
had obtained over 80 Highlanders so 4 whom were slain but died like
Heroes killing three their number
The 28th bad Weather obliged the men of War to pull out of port
but one man had been killed. Here upon the Siege was raised.

Illustration No. 3

"A Draught of the Matanza Inlet as taken by Lieut. Todiman of the Phonex who was sent with the Pilots of the men of War on purpose to sound the same." British Museum, from photostat in the Library of Congress.



The Road from Nipmuck River to Little Fort

Nikansa Inlet
7 feet at Low Water

Pugon Creek

River S. Anastasia

S. Anastasia

Anastasia Island

Small Hill

Map of Alaska
1866
Scale of 1 Mile

Inlet mistaken by Lieut. Todman
of the Phoenix who was sent
with the Pilots of the Men of
War on purpose to sound the alarm


A Scale of 3 Miles

Illustration No. 4

"A Plan of the Harbour of St. Augustine and the
Adjacent Parts in Florida representing the Field
of Action with the Disposition of the Forces Before
that Castle in the Expedition under General Oglethorpe
in 1740." New York Public Library, from photostat in
the Library of Congress.

Illustration No. 5

"Map of the Coast of Florida, from Talbot Island . . .,"
undated, anonymous; including the town of St. Augustine,
and showing the main positions of the English during the
siege of 1740. British Museum, from photostat in Library
of Congress.




EXPLANATION OR


- A. The Town of St. Augustine about one mile in length having a Rivulet around it.
- B. The Castle built by Observation. 29. 59. N with water round it and a Drawbridge of Communication with the Town.
- C. The River Matanzas its Entrance is at the Barr of Augustine.
- D. The North part of the Island of Anastasia lying to the Eastward of the Town parted by the River Matanzas is a Mile in Breadth the West part of it is Marshland overflowed at Spring Tides the East part Sand. Hummocks and Palmetto Bushes.
- E. St. Marks River which runs almost to St. Johns River the S^o part of Georgia
- F. Point Quartil where Coll Vanderdusen first Pitched his Tents with the Carolina Soldiers.
- G. The North Chanel to Matanzas River
- H. The North Breaker Shoals w^h Part dry.
- I. The South Breaker Shoul.
- K. The Barr of Augustine the Entrance of the South Chanel which for its Shoalness Ships of Force cannot Enter.
- L. The Place where General Oglethorpe landed with his Soldiers Sailors & Indians under Cover of the 20 Gun Ships without Opposition.
- M. A Stake sand Battery Quitted.

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- N. Quarrys of Stone.
 - O. The Generals Tent and main Guard.
 - P. The Sailors.
 - Q. The Indians. } Tents.
 - R. The Carolina Soldiers. }
 - S. A Battery of Sand Baggs with two 18. Pounders, and a Mortar w^h 24. 1. 16.
 - T. A Sand Battery of Four 18 Pounders one 9 Pounder and 2 small Mortars 2 a Mile from the River.
 - U. The Lookout Quitted.
 - V. A Palmetto House and Cornfields to the Westward of which (on the Marsh) Twenty Cohorns play'd upon the Town.
 - W. The Place from which the Prospect of the Town and Castle was taken.
 - X. Wells dug by the Seamen to water their Shipping.
 - Y. The Sailors hawling Cannon in the Day time in reach of the Enemy's Cannon.
 - Z. Galleys & half Galleys which Annoy'd & Forced.
 - Ac. Centinels of Soldiers.
 - 1. A Scooner Sloops and Penangers Tenders to the General and Shipping.
 - 2. } Flambrough.
 - 3. } Hector.
 - 4. His Majestys Ships. } Phoenix.
 - 5. } Squirrel.
 - 6. } Tartar.
 - 7. His Majestys Sloops. } Spence.
 - 8. } Wolf
- This Coast is very subject in April. May and June to squalls. Rain Thunder and Lightning and once in three years to Hurricanes.




The Road to S Juans



EXPLANATION OR

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 B. The Castle built by Observation. 29. 59. N with water round it and a Drawbridge of Communication with the Town.
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 R. The Carolina Soldiers.
 S. A Battery of Sand Bags with two 18. Pounders, and a Mortar w^h 24. 1. 6.
 T. A Sand Battery of Four 18 Pounders one 9 Pounder and 2 small Mortars 2 a Mile from the River.
 U. The Lookout Quitted.
 V. A Palmetto Honte and Cornfields to the Westward of which (on the Marth) Twenty Cohons play'd upon the Town.
 W. The Place from which the Prospect of the Town and Castle was taken.
 X. Wells dug by the Seamen to water their Shipping.
 Y. The Sailors hawling Cannon in the Day time in reach of the Enemys Cannon.
 Z. Galleys & half Galleys which Annoy'd & Force &c. Gentinels of Soldiers.
 1. A Scooner Sloops and Pendants Tenders to the General and Shipping.
 2. ...
 3. ...
 4. His Majestys Ships. { Flambrough.
 5. ... { Hector.
 6. ... { Phoenix.
 7. His Majestys Sloops. { Squirrel.
 8. ... { Tartar.
 9. ... { Spence.
 10. ... { Wolf
 This Coast is very subject in April. May and June to squalls. Rain Thunder and Lightning and once in three years to Hurricanes.

